



## ▶ SE6 safety module



Operating Manual-1004205-EN-02-STÖBER ID 442796.02



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Where unavoidable, for reasons of readability, the masculine form has been selected when formulating this document. We do assure you that all persons are regarded without discrimination and on an equal basis.

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SD means Secure Digital

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# 1 Introduction

The safety module and its integration into the drive controller are the result of close co-operation between Pilz GmbH & Co. KG and STÖBER Antriebstechnik GmbH + Co. KG.

## 1.1 Consulting, service, address

Our website provides you with detailed information and a range of services related to our products:

<https://www.stoeber.en/services>

For additional or personalised information, contact our system support:

<http://www.stoeber.en/en/support>

Tel: +49 7231 582-3060

[systemsupport@stoeber.de](mailto:systemsupport@stoeber.de)

Call our 24-hour service hotline:

Tel: +49 7231 582-3000

Our address is:

STÖBER ANTRIEBSTECHNIK GmbH + Co. KG

Kieselbronner Straße 12

75177 Pforzheim, Germany

## 1.2 Validity of documentation

This documentation is valid for the safety module SE6 . It is valid until new documentation is published.

STÖBER provides the latest document versions to download from its website: <https://www.stoeber.en/downloads>

## 1.3 Retaining the documentation

This documentation is intended for instruction and should be retained for future reference.

Please hand over this documentation when selling or passing on the product to a third party.

## 1.4 Disclaimer

This document was compiled in accordance with current standards, regulations and technical developments.

Pilz and STÖBER cannot be held liable for any damage resulting from non-adherence to the documentation or inappropriate use of the product. This particularly applies to damage caused by individual technical modifications to the project or its use and operation by non-qualified staff.

## 1.5 Further information

This operating manual explains the function and operation of the safety module SE6 and provides guidelines on how to connect the product.

You should also consider the following:

- ▶ The configuration of the safety module SE6 is also described in the online help for the PASmotion.
- ▶ The document "Safety module SE6 - Diagnostics" (ID 442768)

The documentation listed in the following table provides additional relevant information about the SD6 drive controller. You will find current document versions at:

<https://www.stoeber.en/downloads>

Device	Documentation	Contents	ID
SD6 drive controller	Manual	System structure, technical data, storage, installation, connection, commissioning, operation, service, diagnosis	442426

You will need to be conversant with the information in these documents in order to fully understand this operating manual.



## 1.6 Definition of symbols

Information that is particularly important is identified as follows:



### **DANGER!**

This warning must be heeded! It warns of a hazardous situation that poses an immediate threat of serious injury and death and indicates preventive measures that can be taken.



### **WARNING!**

This warning must be heeded! It warns of a hazardous situation that could lead to serious injury and death and indicates preventive measures that can be taken.



### **CAUTION!**

This refers to a hazard that can lead to a less serious or minor injury plus material damage, and also provides information on preventive measures that can be taken.



### **NOTICE**

This describes a situation in which the product or devices could be damaged and also provides information on preventive measures that can be taken. It also highlights areas within the text that are of particular importance.



### **INFORMATION**

This gives advice on applications and provides information on special features.

## 2 Overview

The safety module SE6 expands the Drive controller SD6 by adding drive-integrated safety functions in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.

The SE6 safety module can be combined with STÖBER drive controllers of the SD6 series in sizes 0 – 3.

The safety module SE6 contains the following safety-related functions:

- ▶ Stop functions
- ▶ Safe motion functions
- ▶ Safe monitoring functions
- ▶ Safe brake functions
- ▶ Protection against unintended restart

In addition to the safety module itself, the following components are involved in the safety functions of the Drive controller:

- ▶ Non-safety-related external encoders
- ▶ Non-safety-related motor encoders
- ▶ Non-safety-related mechanical brakes

### 2.1 Structure

The safety module has a two-channel structure with internal diagnostic tests, thus no external safety system is required. The non-safe properties and functions of the Drive controller do not affect the functional safety of the safety module.

### 2.2 Safety functions

The safety module SE6 contains the following safety functions:

#### **Safe stop functions in accordance with EN 61800-5-2**

- ▶ Safe Torque Off (STO)
- ▶ Safe stop 1 (SS1)
- ▶ Safe stop 2 (SS2)

#### **Safe motion functions in accordance with EN 61800-5-2**

- ▶ Safe Direction (SDI)
- ▶ Safely limited increment (SLI)
- ▶ Safely Limited Speed (SLS)
- ▶ Safe Operating Stop (SOS)
- ▶ Safe Speed Range (SSR)
- ▶ Safely Limited Position (SLP)

#### Safe monitoring functions

- ▶ Safely Monitored Direction (SDI-M)
- ▶ Safely monitored increment (SLI-M)
- ▶ Safely Monitored Speed (SLS-M)
- ▶ Safely monitored operation stop (SOS-M)
- ▶ Safely Monitored Speed Range (SSR-M)
- ▶ Safely Monitored Position (SLP-M)

#### Safe brake functions

- ▶ Safe brake control (SBC)
- ▶ Safe brake test (SBT)

#### Other functions

- ▶ Safe Restart Lock (SRL)
- ▶ Safe Status Output (SSO)

#### Reaction functions

When a limit value violation or an internal error is detected, the safety module SE6 triggers a reaction function. This switches off the motor and safely interrupts torque/force generation.

- ▶ Safe stop 1 (SS1)
- ▶ Safe Torque Off (STO)


#### Safe monitoring functions (safe signalling)

Safe monitoring functions correspond to the normative safety functions, with the exception of the error reactions. They are marked XXX-M. When set limit values are exceeded:

- ▶ No safe stop 1 (SS1) triggered
- ▶ There is a 0-signal at the output

## 2.3

### Features

- ▶ 8 safe, single-pole hardware inputs, which can be freely assigned for the activation of safety functions.
- ▶ 5 safe, single-pole hardware outputs, which can be freely assigned the status of safety functions.
- ▶ 1 encoder interface for connection of an additional external TTL or SSI encoder.
- ▶ 1 safe dual-pole hardware output to control a standby current-operated, mechanical brake.
- ▶ 1 dual-pole brake output for functional and safety-related use ([Application of the SBC and SBT safe brake functions](#) [ 58]).

The safety functions are allocated to the inputs and outputs in the configuration tool of the safety module.

## 2.4 Terminal list SD6, Size 0




Fig.: Terminal list SD6, Size 0

### Legend

- 1 Housing grounding
- 2 X10: Supply 230 V<sub>AC</sub> / 400 V<sub>AC</sub>
- 3 X11: Supply 24 V<sub>DC</sub>
- 4 X50: SE6 safety technology (encoder)
- 5 X14: SE6 safety technology (safe inputs)
- 6 X15: SE6 safety technology (safe outputs and supply for X50)
- 7 X3A, X3B: PC, IGB
- 8 X200, X201: EC6 communication module (EtherCAT) and PN6 (PROFINET) or X200: CA6 (CANopen)
- 9 X120: Encoder connection at XI6 terminal module (alternatively X120 and X140: encoder connections at RI6 terminal module)
- 10 X4: Encoder
- 11 X1: Release and relays
- 12 X2: Motor temperature sensor
- 13 X8: Brake 2 (SBC+/-)
- 14 X7: Brake supply
- 15 X5: Brake 1 (BD1/BD2)
- 16 X20: Motor
- 17 X30: Intermediate circuit connection, brake resistor

## 2.5 Terminal list SD6, Size 1




Fig.: Terminal list SD6, Size 1

### Legend

- 1 Housing grounding
- 2 X10: Supply 400 V<sub>AC</sub>
- 3 X11: Supply 24 V<sub>DC</sub>
- 4 X50: SE6 safety technology (encoder)
- 5 X14: SE6 safety technology (safe inputs)
- 6 X15 SE6 safety technology (safe outputs and supply for X50)
- 7 X3A, X3B: PC, IGB
- 8 X200, X201: EC6 communication module (EtherCAT) and PN6 (PROFINET) or X200: CA6 (CANopen)
- 9 X120: Encoder connection at XI6 terminal module (alternatively X120 and X140: encoder connections at RI6 terminal module)
- 10 X4: Encoder
- 11 X1: Release and relays
- 12 X2: Motor temperature sensor

- 13 X8: Brake 2 (SBC+/-)
- 14 X7: Brake supply
- 15 X5: Brake 1 (BD1/BD2)
- 15 X20: Motor
- 17 X30: Intermediate circuit connection, brake resistor

## 2.6 Terminal list SD6, Size 2




Fig.: Terminal list SD6, Size 2

### Legend

- 1 Housing grounding
- 2 X10: Supply 400 V<sub>AC</sub>
- 3 X11: Supply 24 V<sub>DC</sub>
- 4 X50: SE6 safety technology (encoder)
- 5 X14: SE6 safety technology (safe inputs)
- 6 X15: SE6 safety technology (safe outputs and supply for X50)
- 7 X3A, X3B: PC, IGB
- 8 X200, X201: EC6 communication module (EtherCAT) and PN6 (PROFINET) or X200: CA6 (CANopen)

- 9 X120: Encoder connection at XI6 terminal module  
(alternatively X120 and X140: encoder connections at RI6 terminal module)
- 10 X4: Encoder
- 11 X1: Release and relays
- 12 X2: Motor temperature sensor
- 13 X8: Brake 2 (SBC+/-)
- 14 X7: Brake supply
- 15 X5: Brake 1 (BD1/BD2)
- 16 X20: Motor
- 17 X30: Intermediate circuit connection, brake resistor

## 2.7 Terminal list SD6, Size 3




Fig.: Terminal overview SD6; size 3

### Legend

- 1 X10: Supply 400 V<sub>AC</sub>
- 2 X11: Supply 24 V<sub>DC</sub>
- 3 X50: Safety technology SE6 (encoder)
- 4 X14: Safety technology SE6 (safe inputs)
- 5 X15: Safety technology SE6 (safe outputs and supply for X50)
- 6 X3A, X3B: PC, IGB
- 7 X200, X201: EC6 communication modules (EtherCAT) and PN6 (PROFINET) or X200: CA6 (CANopen)
- 8 X120: Encoder connection at XI6 terminal module (alternatively X120 and X140: encoder connections at RI6 terminal module)
- 9 X4: Encoder
- 10 X1: Release and relays
- 11 X2: Motor temperature sensor
- 12 X8: Brake 2 (SBC+/-)
- 13 X7: Brake supply
- 14 X5: Brake 1 (BD1/BD2)
- 15 X20: Motor, intermediate circuit connection, brake resistor



## 3 Safety

### 3.1 Intended use

The Drive controller SD6 with installed safety module SE6 is a safety component in accordance with Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC Appendix IV and intended for use in safety-related applications.


The following conditions have been met:

- ▶ the EN 61800-5-2 requirements for drive-integrated safety functions
- ▶ the requirements of EN 62061 to SIL CL3
- ▶ the requirements of EN ISO 13849-1 to PL e (Category 4)

Intended use includes compliance with the

- ▶ operating manual Drive controller SD6.
- ▶ the online help function for the PASmotion configuration tool.
- ▶ EMC-compliant assembly and wiring.

The following is deemed improper use

- ▶ any structural, technical or electrical modification of Drive controller.
- ▶ use of Drive controller for applications other than those described in this operating manual.
- ▶ Use of the Drive controller contrary to the documented technical details (see "[Technical Details](#)" [ 188]).

The safety module SE6 may only be used in combination with the following drive controllers:

Drive controller size	Drive controller
Size 0	SD6A02
	SD6A04
	SD6A06
Size 1	SD6A14
	SD6A16
Size 2	SD6A24
	SD6A26
Size 3	SD6A34
	SD6A36
	SD6A38

### 3.1.1 Permitted motor types

The following motor types are approved for use with the safety module:

- ▶ Rotary synchronous motors
- ▶ Linear synchronous motors
- ▶ Asynchronous motors



#### INFORMATION

The operation of synchronous motors without a motor encoder (sensorless operation) is not permitted.

### 3.1.2 Approved motor encoders

The motor encoder is connected to an input on the drive controller. The following motor encoders are approved for use with the safety module:

Approved motor encoders
Resolver
Encoder EnDat 2.1/2.2 digital
Encoder EnDat 2.1 Sin/Cos
Linear encoder EnDat 2.2 digital
SSI encoder
SSI linear encoder
Sin/Cos linear encoder
HTL, TTL incremental encoder
HTL, TTL Hall encoder

The motor encoders listed can be connected to the various interfaces of the drive controller and its optional modules, as required.

### 3.1.3 Approved external encoders




#### NOTICE

To guarantee the diversity and to prevent common cause failures (CCF) the external encoder must not be from the same manufacturer as the motor encoder (take care with badged products!).

Approved external encoders
SSI
TTL

Connection to the safety module SE6 is via X50.

For further information about wiring, see [External encoder](#)  163].

For further information about the use of external encoders, see [Motor encoder fault detection](#) [ 44].

### 3.1.4 Permitted brakes

Only standby current-operated mechanical brakes may be used.


The following brakes are not approved for use with the safety module:

- ▶ Magnetic powder brakes
- ▶ Eddy current brakes

#### **Important values from the data sheet of the standby current-operated mechanical brake**

For the configuration of the brake test, the following values from the data sheet of the standby current-operated mechanical brake can be relevant:

- ▶ Permitted switching frequency
- ▶ Brake engagement time


You find further information on this in chapter [Brake test](#) [ 134] (SBT).

## 3.2 Safety regulations

### 3.2.1 Safety assessment

Before using a device, a safety assessment in accordance with the Machinery Directive is required.

The product as an individual component fulfils the functional safety requirements in accordance with EN ISO 13849 and EN 62061. However, this does not guarantee the functional safety of the overall plant/machine. To achieve the relevant safety level of the overall plant/machine's required safety functions, each safety function needs to be considered separately.

The user is responsible for the safety of the project created in the PASmotion configuration tool. Pay special attention when configuring the project and observe local standards and regulations (see also [Safety checks](#) [ 174]).

### 3.2.2 Use of qualified personnel

The products may only be assembled, installed, programmed, commissioned, operated, maintained and decommissioned by persons who are competent to do so.

A competent person is a qualified and knowledgeable person who, because of their training, experience and current professional activity, has the specialist knowledge required. To be able to inspect, assess and operate devices, systems and machines, the person has to be informed of the state of the art and the applicable national, European and international laws, directives and standards.

It is the company's responsibility only to employ personnel who

- ▶ Are familiar with the basic regulations concerning health and safety / accident prevention,
- ▶ Have read and understood the information provided in the section entitled Safety
- ▶ Have a good knowledge of the generic and specialist standards applicable to the specific application.

### 3.2.3 Warranty and liability

All claims to warranty and liability will be rendered invalid if


- ▶ The product was used contrary to the purpose for which it is intended,
- ▶ Damage can be attributed to not having followed the guidelines in the manual,
- ▶ Operating personnel are not suitably qualified,
- ▶ Any type of modification has been made (e.g. exchanging components on the PCB boards, soldering work etc.).


### 3.2.4 Disposal

- ▶ In safety-related applications, please comply with the mission time  $T_M$  in the safety-related characteristic data.
- ▶ When decommissioning, please comply with local regulations regarding the disposal of electronic devices (e.g. Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act).

### 3.3 Error types, error detection and error reaction

The safety module SE6 has various functions for error detection, with a detected error always resulting in a defined error reaction.

The error types are described in chapter [Operating states](#) [ 177].

Error detection and error reaction are described in the sub-chapters of chapter [Function description](#) [ 24].

### 3.4 Data backup and data security

Various data security mechanisms are used on the safety module SE6. A distinction is made between technical measures and organisational measures.

#### Technical measures

Technical measures contribute towards data security with regard to errors and faults. They automatically come into effect as soon as data is exposed to external influences (e.g. errors due to electromagnetic interference). Technical measures include, for example

- ▶ Redundancy when recording and processing safe signals
- ▶ Backup procedure when downloading a project
- ▶ Noise immunity

#### Organisational measures

Organisational measures contribute towards data security with regard to accidental or intentional data manipulation. The user is primarily responsible for applying appropriate organisational measures.

Organisational measures can mainly be covered with the term "Security". We recommend that you develop a comprehensive strategy with regard to security measures. All criteria that concern the integrity, availability, confidentiality, liability, operational safety and authenticity of data fall under the term "security" (see also the ISO/IEC 27000 series of standards).

Security measures include, for example:

- ▶ Authentication
- ▶ Password management
- ▶ Logical and functional division of the office and automation environment on Ethernet-based networks, through firewalls for example
- ▶ Mechanical interlock on unused Ethernet interfaces on the control systems

### **Data security measures on the configurable safety module SE6**

The safety module SE6 has the following technical and organisational data security measures:

- ▶ Assignment of various access permissions for a configuration in the PASmotion configuration tool  
Each project must be assigned 2 passwords. The passwords are used to define access permissions to a different function range (see online help for PASmotion).
- ▶ Detection of different configurations  
(CRC) check sums are included when a configuration is downloaded. Different configurations can be detected based on this information.
- ▶ Detection of a deviating check sum by the paramodule and in the flash memory when restarting a safety module
- ▶ Detection of an invalid configuration when restarting a safety module
- ▶ Detection of faulty or incompatible configurations when restarting the safety module

## 4 Security

To secure plants, systems, machines and networks against cyberthreats it is necessary to implement (and continuously maintain) an overall industrial security concept that is state of the art.

Carry out a risk analysis in accordance with VDI/VDE 2182 or IEC 62443-3-2 and plan the security measures with care. If necessary, seek advice from STÖBER System Support.

- ▶ The product is not protected from physical manipulation or from reading of memory contents during physical access. Use appropriate measures to ensure that there is no physical access by unauthorised persons. You should also use security seals so that you can detect any manipulation of the product or interfaces. Installation inside a lockable control cabinet is recommended as a minimum measure.
- ▶ The configuration computer that accesses the product has to be protected from attacks by a firewall or other suitable measures. We recommend that a virus scanner is used on this configuration computer and updated regularly.
- ▶ If necessary, protect the configuration computer and the product from unauthorised use by assigning passwords and taking further measures if required. We also recommend that the user logged on to this configuration computer does not have administrator rights.
- ▶ Only assign strong passwords and handle the passwords carefully. Be guided by generally accepted guidelines such as NIST 800-63b for example.
- ▶ Assign different permissions for the various user groups (e.g. diagnostics - configuration).




Fig.: Example network topology

## 5 Function description

### 5.1 Overview

The safety module SE6 is incorporated into the Drive controller SD6. Assembly and inspection take place before delivery by STÖBER. It is not possible for customers to retrofit the safety module. In the following, the combination of Drive controller and integrated safety module is called a safe Drive controller.

A **safe drive system** consists of:

- ▶ a safe Drive controller.
- ▶ a motor with motor encoder.
- ▶ an external encoder (optional).
- ▶ standby current-activated mechanical brakes (standard or safety components, optional).
- ▶ a programmable safety system.
- ▶ a configuration tool (PASmotion).



#### **INFORMATION**

The safety configurator PASmotion forms part of the STÖBER DriveControl-Suite from Version V6.3-B.






Fig.: Safe drive system

### Legend

- SO1 Safe, single-pole hardware outputs (X15, STO)
- STO Safe pulse block 1 and safe pulse block 2
- SI1 Safe single-pole input (X14)
- BO2 Dual-pole brake output for functional and safety-related use (X5)
- SBO2 Safe dual-pole brake output (X8)
- MB Motor brake
- P Driven device
- ME Motor encoder
- ExE External encoder
- PWM Pulse width modulation
- ExB External brake

### The safety module SE6 (depending on the configuration)

- ▶ performs a plausibility check on the connected motor-encoder and uses that to generate safe speed and position values.

- ▶ compares the current speed or the current position with the limit values and triggers a response function when a limit value was violated.
- ▶ signals the status of safety functions to the programmable safety system.
- ▶ activates controlled shut-down by the Drive controller (optional) for the SS1 and SS2 safety functions.
- ▶ activates the integrated safe pulse lock on request or in the event of an error.
- ▶ has an option for safe triggering of up to two standby current-activated, mechanical brakes.
- ▶ detects faults in the mechanical brakes by means of a brake test.
- ▶ has a connection for an optional, external encoder.
- ▶ detects faults (cross-wire fault, short circuits) in the wiring of the output signals and initiates an error reaction.

#### **The safe drive controller**

- ▶ interrupts the torque/power generation by the motor when the pulse lock is activated.
- ▶ brings the motor to a standstill when the SS1 or SS2 safety function is activated.
- ▶ transfers the configuration data from the configuration tool to the safety module.
- ▶ saves the device configuration on the drive controller's paramodule.
- ▶ reads the error memory of the safety module and provides detailed status information.

#### **The programmable safety system**

- ▶ evaluates signals from safety devices, such as:
  - Emergency stop pushbuttons
  - Safety gates
  - Light barriers
  - Two-hand pushbuttons
- ▶ activates the safety functions via inputs on the safety module (optional).
- ▶ processes safe feedback outputs of the safety module (optional).
- ▶ detects faults (cross-wire fault, short circuits) in the wiring to the safety module and initiates an error reaction (optional).

#### **The PASmotion configuration tool**

- ▶ configures and parametrises the safety module.
- ▶ ensures safe uploading and downloading of the configuration file.
- ▶ displays the status of the inputs/outputs in the online display.
- ▶ displays the error stack.

## 5.2 General definitions

### 5.2.1 Resolution of position values

The internal resolution of the safety module is always 4096 increments per revolution, irrespective of the specific application and resolution of the motor encoder (optional, user-defined planned units are converted accordingly).



#### **WARNING!**

#### **Functional restriction of the safety function due to the use of user-defined units!**


The use of user-defined units for position values can lead to a loss of accuracy due to conversion and rounding errors.

### 5.2.2 Determination of the rotation/movement direction

Determination of the rotation/movement direction of the motor (relative to the motor shaft when looking towards the motor flange)

- ▶ left, negative, counter-clockwise (CCW)
- ▶ right, positive, clockwise (CW)

### 5.2.3 Error definition

- ▶ Definition of internal error  
An internal error is an error that occurred in the system and could not be removed by the user.
- ▶ Fault definition: STOP, FAULT, FATAL and "movement monitoring safety function"  
see [Operating states](#) [ 177]

## 5.3 Activation and feedback on safety functions

The safety functions of the safety module SE6 are activated or deactivated by evaluating the signal levels on the safe inputs. These inputs operate in accordance with the standby current principle. The programmable safety system activates the safety functions via a 0 signal.

The states/status of the safety functions of the safety module SE6 can be reported via outputs to the programmable safety system.

### 5.3.1 Activation of the safety functions via hardware inputs

The safe hardware inputs of the safety module detect NO errors in the wiring.

One of the following measures must be applied to ensure safe connection between the programmable safety system and the safety module:

- ▶ Error detection by tested control signals and shutdown in the event of an error by a second shutdown route.
- ▶ Error elimination for short circuit between any of two conductors according to EN ISO 13849-2, Table D.4.
- ▶ Error detection through feedback of status signals of the safety module and shutdown in the event of an error by a second shutdown route.




Fig.: Activation of a safety function with fault detection by testing

#### Legend

- A Error detection by tested control signal and shutdown by a second, STO\_ACT shutdown route in the event of an error.
- B The safe hardware inputs of the safety module detect NO errors in the wiring.
- C Error detection with tested control signals and shutdown by the SS1 function in the event of an error.




Fig.: Activation of a safety function with fault exclusion

### Legend

- A Error elimination for short circuit between any of two conductors according to EN ISO 13849-2, Table D.4.




Fig.: Activation of a safety function with fault detection by feedback

### Legend

- A Error detection (short circuit and short across contacts) by evaluating the SS1\_ACK signal in the higher-level controller and shutdown by a second, STO\_ACT shutdown route in the event of an error.
- B The safe hardware inputs of the safety module detect NO errors in the wiring.
- C Error detection by evaluating the SxA signal of the activated safety function in the higher-level controller. Shutdown by the SS1 function in the event of an error.
- D The safe hardware outputs of the safety module detect errors in the wiring. The SS1 safety function is activated and the motor is shut down when an error is detected.

### 5.3.2 Feedback of the safety functions via hardware inputs

The states/status of the safety functions of the safety module SE6 can be reported via safe hardware outputs to the programmable safety system.


- ▶ 1 signal at the exit of the safety function means:
  - the safety module reports a safe state (depending on the respective safety function).
- ▶ 0 signal at the exit of the safety function means:
  - the safety function is not active, or
  - the allocated safety function has detected a dangerous state or
  - the output has not been assigned to a safety function.

### Fault detection in wiring

Detecting the safe hardware outputs of the safety module:

- ▶ Short circuits to 24 V<sub>DC</sub>
- ▶ Short circuits to 0 V
- ▶ Shorts across contacts

The motor is safely shut down by the SS1 safety function when an error is detected.

- a 1 signal is issued at the SS1\_ACK output.
- A 1 signal is put on the STO\_ACK output when the motor has been safely switched to a torque-/power-free state, see [Safe stop 1 \(SS1\)](#) [ 83].

### Fault prevention and fault detection during overvoltage



#### CAUTION!

#### Loss of safety

Overvoltage > 40 V in the connection between safety module and programmable safety system can lead to loss of safety. Feeding overvoltage in the programmable safety system to the 1-pole hardware outputs of the safety module may cause switched-off hardware outputs to provide a 1 signal.

- Use a power supply with overvoltage protection for the output voltage for the programmable safety system.
- Limit the output voltage to a max. of 40 V.

#### Measures for fault detection and triggering of error reactions:

- ▶ The safety module detects overvoltage and triggers the SS1 safety function as an error reaction. The safety module switches to the operating state STO.
- ▶ The defective safety controller must detect the fault and switch to a safe state.

#### Additional fault detection required when coupling a safety module with several safety controllers:

When the safe hardware outputs of the safety module are distributed over several, independent safety controllers,

- ▶ The STO-ACK output must be evaluated on each safety controller.
- ▶ A plausibility check of the STO\_ACK signal with the respective feedback signals must be performed on each safety controller.

An error is present when an Acknowledge output (SxA) and the STO\_ACK output provide a 1-signal at the same time.

**One of the following measures must be applied to ensure safe connection between the programmable safety system and the safety module:**

- ▶ Error elimination for short circuit between any of two conductors according to EN ISO 13849-2, Table D.4.
- ▶ Evaluation of a second, additional feedback signal (STO\_ACK) by the programmable safety system.




Fig.: Feedback on safety functions with fault exclusion

**Legend**

- A Fault exclusion for short circuit between any two conductors in accordance with EN ISO 13849-2, Table D.4






Fig.: Feedback from safety functions with evaluation of a second, additional feedback signal

### Legend

- A Evaluation of the safety function's feedback signal STO\_ACK.  
When a fault is detected on the safe hardware outputs of the safety module, the motor is stopped by activating the SS1 function and STO is activated. This is detected by the safety controller through evaluation of the STO\_ACK signal.
- B The safe hardware outputs of the safety module detect errors in the wiring.  
The SS1 safety function is activated and the motor stopped when a fault is detected.

## 5.4 Hardware inputs/outputs

The safety module has

- ▶ Safe hardware inputs, which can be mapped to the safety functions' activation inputs.
- ▶ Safe hardware outputs, which can be mapped to the safety functions' feedback outputs.

Hardware inputs and outputs are assigned to the safety functions in the configuration tool.




Fig.: Assignment hardware inputs/outputs

### Legend

Line width light	Deactivated safety function
<b>Line width bold</b>	<b>Activated safety function</b>

### 5.4.1 Hardware inputs

#### Assignment of the hardware inputs

If a hardware input is assigned to an activation input of a safety function, this is read in and evaluated cyclically during operation.

#### Signals at the hardware input

0 signal at the input: Safety function is activated

1 signal at the input: Safety function is deactivated

#### Properties of the safe hardware inputs

The hardware inputs of the safety module can be controlled from the following outputs of a higher-level controller:

- ▶ Semiconductor outputs
- ▶ Contact-based outputs

The hardware inputs of the safety module correspond to

- ▶ The C-type interface from the ZVEI position paper "Classification of Binary 24 V Interfaces - Functional Safety aspects covered by dynamic testing" (see [Technical details \[188\]](#)).
- ▶ A type 1 input in accordance with IEC 61131-2.

With the hardware input active (1 signal), the correct function of the internal input circuitry is checked during every cycle ( $T_{\text{CYCLE}}$ , see [Reaction times \[47\]](#)). This is done by test pulsing.

### Signal detection at the hardware inputs

- ▶ A signal (0 signal or 1 signal) is always ignored if it is present for less than the minimum processing time.
- ▶ A signal is always detected and transmitted to the process image (PI) if it is present for longer than the maximum processing time (see diagram).




Fig.: Timing diagram for signal detection

### Legend

Input	Signal at the input
$t_1$	Minimum processing time = filter time (adjustable) (see <a href="#">Technical details [188]</a> )
$t_2$	Maximum processing time = filter time (adjustable) + 1 cycle (see <a href="#">Technical details [188]</a> )
PII	Status of the process image of inputs (PII) (PII – Process Image Input)
Grey shaded area	Status of process image (PII) undefined

### Input filter (pulse suppression)

The hardware inputs can be fitted with software input filters. The characteristic of the input filter corresponds to a 1st-order low pass.

Switch-off pulses, greater than the selected filter time, are identified reliably.

**Configuration of the input filter time in the configuration tool:**

From the **Window** menu bar select the button **I/O settings**.

Physical address	Filter time	Filter time	Unit	Description
IO: I0 ... IO: Ix	Activate/deactivate	1 ... 10	[ms]	The filter time can be activated/deactivated and the time specified for each hardware input.  (default: activated, 1 ms)

**5.4.2 Hardware outputs****5.4.2.1 Safe 1-pole hardware outputs****Mapping of the 1-pole hardware outputs**

If a hardware output is assigned to a feedback output of a safety function, this is updated cyclically during operation.

**0 signal (0 V) at hardware output:**

- ▶ Output is high impedance.
- ▶ No current to the load.
- ▶ Activated safety function reports a limit value violation or a hazardous status.
- ▶ Safety function is not active.

**1 signal (+24 V<sub>DC</sub>) at hardware output:**

- ▶ Output is low impedance.
- ▶ Current is supplied to the load.
- ▶ Activated safety function reports the safe status.

A deactivated safety function always supplies a 0 signal to at the assigned output.

**NOTICE****STO operating status**

In the STO operating status, a 0 signal is output at all feedback outputs of the configured safety functions.

Exceptions:

Feedback output STO\_ACK of the safety function SS1 reports the active status STO with a 1 signal.

Feedback output SBT\_SBA of the safety function SBT remains set throughout the inspection period.

### Shared output

When assigning hardware outputs there is the option of assigning multiple feedback outputs of safety functions to one hardware output. As soon as a feedback output of an active safety function (i.e. safety function is activated and the delay time has elapsed) issues a 0 value as the status, the hardware output is set to 0.



#### NOTICE

**Deactivated safety functions are disregarded by the shared output.**

Even if a deactivated safety function has a 0 value, the shared output can still issue a 1-signal.

Only activated safety functions contribute to the result.




Fig.: Example for shared output 01

#### Legend

- Safety function 2      Safety function 2 **activated**
- Safety function 3      Safety function 3 **not activated**




Fig.: Example for shared output O2

### Legend

Safety function 2      Safety function 2 **activated**

Safety function 3      Safety function 3 **activated**

### Supply voltage

- ▶ The 1-pole hardware outputs are supplied via the 24 V<sub>DC</sub> feed +24 V\_Vouts (X15).

### General

- ▶ The maximum capacity at a hardware output is limited (see [Classification according to ZVEI, CB24I \[193\]](#), safe single-pole SC outputs). Connecting a higher capacity may lead to an error.
- ▶ Operation with electronic contactors has not been tested and may lead to errors. Observe without fail the specification of the hardware outputs of the safety module SE6 .

### Output test

- ▶ Hardware outputs that are switched on are checked via regular off tests.
  - Test pulses for outputs that are switched on: see [Technical details \[188\]](#)
  - Outputs that are switched on are switched off for the duration of the test pulse.
  - The load must not switch off because of the test.
- ▶ Hardware outputs that are switched off are checked via regular on tests.
  - Test pulses for outputs that are switched off: see [Technical details \[188\]](#)
  - Outputs that are switched off are switched on for the duration of the test pulse.
  - The load must not switch on because of the test.



**WARNING!**

**Risk of injury due to the load switching on unintentionally**

- When wiring a hardware output with capacitance, please note the pulse duration and repetition time of the on test.




Fig.: Timing diagram

**Legend**

- 1 1 signal (high)
- $t_1$  Pulse duration of the on/off test (see [Technical details \[188\]](#))
- $t_2$  Repetition time, normal time between two on/off tests (see [Technical details \[188\]](#))
- 0 0 signal (low)

**Configuring on and off tests**



**NOTICE**

For applications in accordance with PL e (Category 4) and SIL 3, the on and off tests must be switched on (activated).

If a plant is particularly sensitive to test pulses, they may be switched off for individual hardware outputs.

The test must be replaced by other measures, depending on the safety requirement:

- ▶ When on test pulses are switched off
  - The correct switch state is always checked. It is no longer checked whether a switched-off hardware output can still be switched on.
  - The output's ability to switch will not be detected until the next time the hardware output is switched on.
  - There are no longer any switch-on pulses in the output signal.
- ▶ When off test pulses are switched off:
  - The correct switch state is always checked. It is no longer checked whether a switched-on hardware output can be switched off.
  - The output's ability to switch will not be detected until the next time the hardware output is switched off.
  - The supply voltage test for the hardware outputs cannot be switched off. Switch-off pulses are therefore still present in the output signal.

**Configuration of the off tests in the configuration tool:**

From the **Window** menu bar select the button **I/O settings**.

Physical address	On test	Off test	Description
IO: O0 ... IO: Ox	Activated/deactivated  (default: activated)	Activated/deactivated  (default: activated)	It is determined via the selection field whether the on/off test is switched on or off.

**Testing for shorts**

A test is regularly carried out to check for shorts between the hardware outputs.

For applications in accordance with PL e (category 4) and SIL 3, detection of shorts across contacts must be assured by the on/off test.

**5.4.2.2 Non-safety-related 1-pole hardware outputs**

**Non-safety-related 1-pole brake output BD1/BD2**

The 1-pole BD1/BD2 (X5) brake output is used as follows:

- ▶ Non-safety-related addressing of Brake 1 by the drive controller
- ▶ Safe addressing of Brake 1 by the SS1 (safe stop) function with STO (safe torque off) in combination with the SBC (safe brake control, second redundant braking device) and SBT (safe brake test) safety functions

See "Load suspension" with two brakes  71 and Safe stop 1 (SS1)  83



**0 signal (0 V) at the hardware output (BD1/BD2):**

- ▶ Output is high impedance.
- ▶ No current to the load.
- ▶ A connected spring-applied brake is engaged, causing the braking torque/mechanical braking force to be applied to the axis.

**1 signal (+24 V) at the hardware output (BD1/BD2):**

- ▶ Output is low impedance.
- ▶ Current is supplied to the load.
- ▶ A connected closed-current brake is vented, causing the braking torque/mechanical braking force to be removed from the axis.

**5.4.2.3 Safe 2-pole hardware outputs**

**Safe 2-pole brake output (SBC+/SBC-)**

The safety module has a safe 2-pole output (X8) to control a closed-current, mechanical brake. The output is assigned to the safety function SBC (dual-pole).

**0 signal (0 V) at the hardware output (SBC+/SBC-)**

- ▶ Output is high impedance.
- ▶ No current to the load.
- ▶ A connected spring-applied brake is engaged, causing the braking torque/mechanical braking force to be applied to the axis.

**1 signal (+24 V) at the hardware output (SBC+/SBC-)**

- ▶ Output is low impedance.
- ▶ Current is supplied to the load.
- ▶ A connected closed-current brake is vented, causing the braking torque/mechanical braking force to be removed from the axis.




Fig.: IO SBC mapping

### Legend

SBC 2-pole      Safe 2-pole hardware output to control a spring-applied, mechanical brake

### Supply voltage

- ▶ The 2-pole output is supplied via the 24 V<sub>DC</sub> feed at plug X7.

### General

- ▶ The maximum capacity at a hardware output is limited (see [Classification according to ZVEI, CB24I](#) [193], safe dual-pole SC outputs). Connecting a higher capacity may lead to an error.
- ▶ Operation with electronic contactors has not been tested and may lead to errors. You must comply with the specification of the safety module's hardware outputs.
- ▶ Testing the 2-pole hardware output can detect an open circuit.
- ▶ The output cannot be used as a 1-pole output.

### Output test

- ▶ Hardware outputs that are switched on are checked via regular off tests.
  - Test pulses for outputs that are switched on: see [Technical details](#) [188]
  - Outputs that are switched on are switched off for the duration of the test pulse.
  - The load must not switch off because of the test.
- ▶ Hardware outputs that are switched off are checked via regular on tests.
  - Test pulses for outputs that are switched off: see [Technical details](#) [188]
  - Outputs that are switched off are switched on for the duration of the test pulse.
  - The load must not switch on because of the test.

**Open circuit detection**

- ▶ The module will detect an open circuit between the hardware outputs SBC+ and SBC-.
- ▶ The result of open circuit detection is signalled by an error reaction.
- ▶ Loads over 3 kOhm may mistakenly be detected as an open circuit.

## 5.5 Motor encoder fault detection

The different aspects of motor encoder error detection are shown here.

### 5.5.1 Options



#### INFORMATION

Plausibility checks of the motor encoder with internal system variables are possible up to a motor frequency (output frequency of power element) of maximum 700 Hz.

Errors in the connected encoders must be safely detected in order to generate safe speed and position values. The safety module offers various options for performing plausibility tests on the connected motor encoder.

An additional, external encoder is required in some applications. The second encoder can also be used to detect errors in the mechanical transmission path between the motor and the driven device.

Sensor technology	Supported motor type			Supported safety functions		
	Rotary synchronous motor	Linear synchronous motor	Asynchronous motor	SS1, SS2	SOS, SLS, SSR, SDI, SLI, SBC, SBT	SLP
Motor encoder and internal system variables	X	X	--	X	X	--
Motor encoder and external incremental encoder (TTL)	X	X	X	X	X	--
Motor encoder and external absolute encoder (SSI)	X	X	X	X	X	X



#### INFORMATION

Two different encoders are required for the plausibility check when asynchronous motors are used.



**NOTICE**

To guarantee the diversity and to prevent common cause failures (CCF) the external encoder must not be from the same manufacturer as the motor encoder (take care with badged products!).

**Forced dynamisation of encoder**

The axis must be moved within 8 hours as described below when the safety function is active in order to detect errors in the connected encoders even after prolonged standstill of the drive axis:

- ▶ At least one turn of the motor for rotary synchronous motors/asynchronous motors
- ▶ At least a distance of  $(\text{number of poles}/2) * \text{pole pair width}$  for linear synchronous motors

### 5.5.2 Distance to fault detection

Errors in a connected motor encoder can only be detected by a plausibility test using internal system parameters once a minimum distance has been covered. This must be considered in the safety evaluation, for example the determination of the overrun distances. A maximum permitted deviation of the position values of the two encoders can be parametrised in the configuration tool when two encoders are used.

Sensor technology	Fault detection per motor type		
	Rotary synchronous motor	Linear synchronous motor	Asynchronous motor
Motor encoder and internal system variables	At the latest after one mechanical motor turn	At the latest after a movement distance of $(\text{number of poles}/2) * \text{pole pair width}$	--
Motor encoder and external incremental encoder (TTL)	The maximum deviation between the two encoder positions can be parametrised, at the latest after one mechanical motor turn	The maximum deviation between the two encoder positions can be parametrised, at the latest after a movement distance of $(\text{number of poles}/2) * \text{pole pair width}$	The maximum deviation between the two encoder positions can be parametrised, at the latest after one mechanical motor turn
Motor encoder and external absolute encoder (SSI)			

### 5.5.3 Maximum achievable safety integrity

The different options for fault detection can achieve the following maximum values for safety integrity for all safety functions:

Sensor technology	Maximum achievable safety integrity		
	Rotary synchronous motor	Linear synchronous motor	Asynchronous motor
Motor encoder and internal system variables	SIL CL 3 in accordance with EN 62061 PL e (category 4) in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1		
Motor encoder and external incremental encoder (TTL)			
Motor encoder and external absolute encoder (SSI)			

The safety-related characteristic data of the safe drive system depends on the failure rates of the employed encoders.

Various encoders with their failure rates are already considered under [Technical details \[📖 188\]](#)/safety-related characteristic data.

## 5.6 Reaction times

Type-C standards for machines specify minimum distances between a protective device and the hazardous area either directly or by referring to the ISO 13855 international standard.

The overrun of the dangerous movement by the total system must be determined to specify the minimum distances.




Fig.: Determining overrun

### Legend

- T Overall system stopping performance
- $t_1$  Response time of the safeguard
- $t_2$  Stopping time
- a Triggering of the safeguard
- b OFF signal is generated
- c Safe state of machine
- A Sensor/safeguard

- B Higher-level safety controller
- C Safe drive controller
- D Mechanics
- [C1] Input with adjustable input filter
- [C2] Safety module's processor system
- [C3] Delay time of the safe pulse block
- [1] Response time for stop function (stop category 0) via STO\_ACT input
- [2] Response time for stop function (stop category 1) via SS1\_ACT input
- [3] Response time from the activation of motion monitoring to the error reaction of SS1 (delay time 0)
- [4] Reaction time from motion monitoring (already active) to the error reaction of SS1 (delay time 0)

The overrun of a machine's hazardous movement is made up of several times.

This documentation specifies the following times for subsystem C – Safe Drive controller:

Time	Description	Section
T <sub>in</sub>	Maximum processing time of the digital input	<a href="#">Hardware inputs</a>
T <sub>cycle</sub>	Cycle time of the safety module processor system	<a href="#">Technical details</a>
T <sub>pulse</sub>	Delay time of the safe pulse block	<a href="#">Technical details</a>
T <sub>react</sub>	Maximum error reaction time	<a href="#">Reaction times</a>
T <sub>resp</sub>	Maximum response time	<a href="#">Reaction times</a>

#### Maximum error reaction time T<sub>react</sub>

This time includes

- ▶ The cycle time of the safety module processor system.
- ▶ The delay time of the safe pulse block.

This time includes the safety function STO as error reaction function (SS1 with delay time 0).

#### Maximum response time T<sub>resp</sub>

This time includes

- ▶ The maximum processing time of the digital input (dependent on the parametrisable filter time).
- ▶ When triggering a stop function (stop category 0) via the STO-ACT input:
  - The cycle time of the safety module processor system.
- ▶ When triggering a stop function (stop category 1) via the SS1\_ACT input:
  - twice the cycle time of the safety module's processor system.



- ▶ When triggering a safe motion function via the ACT input through to the STO error reaction (SS1 with delay time 0), movement is already hazardous upon activation:
  - three times the cycle time of the safety module's processor system
- ▶ The delay time of the safe pulse block.

### Cycle time of the processor system $T_{\text{cycle}}$

This time includes

- ▶ Reading the inputs and the position values.
- ▶ Executing the safety functions.
- ▶ Detection of limit value violations.
- ▶ Setting the outputs.
- ▶ Triggering the STO safety function in the event of an error.
- ▶ Triggering the SS1 safety function in the event of an error.

### Detecting the violation of a limit value


A limit value violation is only reliably detected if the drive remains in the prohibited area for longer than the cycle time of the  $T_{\text{cycle}}$  processor system.



#### WARNING!

##### A violation of the blocked area is not detected for special applications

If a configured danger zone is only very briefly violated or a narrow, blocked area is traversed at high speed (e.g. while the SLP or SLP-M safety functions are active), such a violation may not be detected by the safety module, due to the specified cycle time of the processor.

- Test the due performance of the safety function if such conditions are really relevant (brief violation of danger zone, rapidly passing through the blocked area).
- Please refer to the chapter [Safety checks](#) [ 174].



#### NOTICE

For the mechanical system (subsystem D), the time it takes for the machine to reach a safe state must be determined.

The times for the stop functions (SS1, SS2) are application-specific and are not included in the stated times.

**INFORMATION****Input filter time**

The input filter times for the hardware inputs I0 ... I7 can be adjusted in the configurator, in the safety functions editor, under "I/O Settings". A value range between 1 ms and 10 ms is available for the filter time. A filter time of 1 ms is the standard setting.

**5.6.1****Reaction time for fault detection on the motor encoder**

One important aspect of the intended use of the safety module SE6 with the permitted motor types (see [Permitted motor types](#) [18]) is that, to detect plausibility between the encoder and internal system variables, the path lengths stated for the different motor types must be taken into account. For a safety reaction, the time taken to activate the safe stop function SS1 and the deceleration of the moving masses should also be taken into account.

Therefore, the reaction time for detecting an error on the motor encoder must take into account a delay, resulting from the time for the required path length plus the time for activating the safety function and the deceleration. This must be taken into account when calculating the minimum distances and overrun on the plant/machine's hazardous movements.

**NOTICE**

An error on the motor encoder can lead to a commutation error on the drive controller (see [Commutation error in the drive controller](#) [50]).

**INFORMATION**

The time it takes to detect an error on the motor encoder can be reduced by using a second, external encoder.

**5.6.2****Commutation error in the drive controller**

Faulty commutation in the drive controller can lead to uncontrolled movement of the motor. Controlled deceleration using the safe stop function SS1 is no longer possible in this case. The following measures can be taken to reduce the related increase in the plant/machine's overrun:

- ▶ Configuration of a shortest possible E-STOP delay time
- ▶ Activation and configuration of brake ramp monitoring in the safe stop function SS1

## 5.7 Safe restart of the machine

A safe standstill during human intervention in hazardous areas is one of the most important requirements for the operation of machinery according to the Machinery Directive.

The EN ISO 14118 standard provides an overview of various measures to avoid unexpected start-up.

If the machine

- ▶ is standing still, resetting the stop command may not trigger a restart, but merely enable it.
- ▶ is standing still following a power failure, the spontaneous restart of a machine when the power supply is reinstated must be prevented if such a restart could pose a risk.
- ▶ is standing still, the effect on machine sensors may not trigger any hazardous movements.

To prevent unexpected start-up, the safety module provides the following safety functions:

- ▶ Safe Torque Off (STO)
- ▶ Safe Operating Stop (SOS)
- ▶ Safe Restart Lock (SRL)




### NOTICE

The start-up behaviour of the safety module following a fault or a stop is described in the following chapter [Resetting \(RESET\) the safety module](#) [📖 52] and must be taken into account when designing the safe restart of the machine.

## 5.8 Resetting (RESET) the safety module


In the operating state STO (see [Operating states](#) [ 177])

- ▶ The safety function STO is activated. (The motor is switched to torque-free/force-free, the drive controller cannot enable the output stage.)
- ▶ There is a 1-signal at the feedback output STO\_ACK.

To exit the operating state STO (see under [Operating states](#) [ 177]), the safety module must be reset (RESET).

**The safety module can be RESET in a variety of ways:**

- ▶ **Safety-related**, by a higher-level safety controller
  - via the inputs SS1\_ACT or STO\_ACT of safety function SS1
  - via the ACT input of safety function SRL (Safe Restart Lock)
- ▶ **Non-safety-related**, by the drive controller
  - via the "ACK" command

The transition of the operating states from STO → STARTUP → RUN/FSRUN on the safety module is called a RESTART (see [Operating states](#) [ 177]). When switching from STARTUP to RUN/FSRUN, the safety function STO is deactivated (the drive controller can enable the output stage) and the motor can execute a movement.

The RESET behaviour of the safety module SE6 can be adapted to the requirements of the application through configuration:

RESET trigger	RESET behaviour	Description
Inputs SS1_ACT/STO_ACT	0: NOP	No operation No RESTART occurs.
	1: RESTART	Acknowledge error The RESTART is triggered.
ACK command from drive controller	0: NOP	No operation No RESTART occurs.
	1: ACK ERR	Acknowledge error No RESTART occurs.
	2: RESTART	Acknowledge error A RESTART is triggered.

RESET trigger	RESET behaviour	Description
Safety function SRL	0: NOP	No operation No RESTART occurs.
	1: ACK ERR	Acknowledge error No RESTART occurs.
	2: RESTART	Acknowledge error A RESTART is triggered.



**NOTICE**

A RESTART of the safety module can only occur if there is a 1-signal at inputs SS1\_ACT and STO\_ACT (optional).

**Safety-related RESET by the inputs SS1\_ACT or STO\_ACT**

The reset of the safety module SE6 is triggered by switching from 0-signal to 1-signal at one of the two inputs.




Fig.: RESET by the inputs SS1\_ACT or STO\_ACT

**Legend**

- NOP            No operation
- RESTART       A RESTART is triggered

**Configuration of the RESET behaviour in the configuration tool**

Field: RESET Trigger SS1: Inputs SS1_ACT/STO_ACT			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
RESET behaviour	0: NOP	--	No operation No RESTART occurs.
	1: RESTART	--	A RESTART is triggered.



**INFORMATION**

A combination with the safety function SRL (safe restart interlock) is possible (see above). The RESTART then only occurs if there is a 1-signal at the input of the safety function SRL (a RESTART is enabled).



**NOTICE**

If the safety module is in the operating state STO without a stop function having been activated (e.g. because of an internal error), there is a 1-signal at the inputs. To trigger resetting of the safety module, the higher-level controller needs to perform the following steps:

- Bring the plant/machine to a safe state
- Create a positive edge at one of the inputs of safety function SS1

**Non-safety-related RESET by the drive controller's ACK command**

The drive controller's ACK command can be used as follows:

- ▶ It performs no operation in the safety module (0: NOP).
- ▶ It acknowledges the error stack of the safety module (1: ACK ERR).
- ▶ It acknowledges the error stack and triggers a RESTART of the safety module (2: RESTART).




Fig.: RESET by the drive controller's ACK command

**Legend**

- NOP            No operation
- ACK ERR      Acknowledge errors
- RESTART      A RESTART is triggered

**Configuration of the RESET behaviour in the configuration tool**

Field: RESET trigger: ACK command from drive controller			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
RESET behaviour	0: NOP	--	No operation No RESTART occurs.
	1: ACK ERR	--	Acknowledge error No RESTART occurs.
	2: RESTART	--	Acknowledge error A RESTART is triggered.



**DANGER!**

**Potentially fatal injuries as a result of unexpected start-up of the motor**

If only the non-safety-related ACK command of the drive controller is used to RESTART the safety module, the drive controller could be enabled unintentionally, causing the motor to start up unexpectedly. Use the ACK command of the drive controller in combination with the safety function Safe Restart Interlock (SRL) or use the inputs SS1\_ACT/STO\_ACT of safety function SS1. Both combinations enable a safety-related RESET of the safety module.



**INFORMATION**

For example, the ACK command can be triggered by the drive controller as follows:

- By pressing the ESC button on the drive controller operating panel.
- By setting the control bit A180, bit 1 (source binary signals device control: A61 must be set to "Parameter").
- By setting the control bit A181, bit 1 (source binary signals device control: S31 must be set to "Parameter")

Further acknowledgement options are available to the drive controller, based on the specific application. These are stated in the drive controller manual.

**Safety-related RESET by the safety function SRL**

The safety function SRL can be used as follows:

- ▶ As safety-related enable for a RESTART (0: NOP, 1: ACK ERR). The RESTART is triggered by the alternative RESTART options for inputs SS1\_ACT/STO\_ACT or by the ACK command of the drive controller.
- ▶ Triggering the RESTART of the safety module (2: RESTART).




Fig.: RESET by the safety function SRL

**Legend**

- NOP            No operation
- ACK ERR       Acknowledge errors
- RESTART       A RESTART is triggered.



**Configuration of the RESET behaviour in the configuration tool**

Field: RESET trigger: Safety function SRL			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
RESET behaviour	0: NOP	--	No operation No RESTART occurs.
	1: ACK ERR	--	Acknowledge error No RESTART occurs.
	2: RESTART	--	Acknowledge error A RESTART is triggered.

The safety function SRL is described in detail under [Safe Restart Lock \(SRL\) \[144\]](#)

**A combination with the ACK command of the drive controller is possible** (see above). The RESTART then only occurs if there is a 1-signal at the input of the safety function SRL (a RESTART is enabled).




Fig.: RESET by the ACK command of the drive controller and enable via the safety function SRL

**Legend**

- NOP            No operation
- ACK ERR       Acknowledge errors
- RESTART       A RESTART is triggered.

## 5.9 Application of the SBC and SBT safe brake functions

The safety module SE6 makes it possible to trigger and test standby current-activated mechanical brakes. Mechanical brakes may be required for various safety functions to reduce the risk in environments in which "load suspension" is common.

Mechanical brakes are particularly used with vertical traversing movements that could endanger operators and third parties. Such movements may pose risks both during operation and when the system is switched off, due to the force of gravity.

If a load has been stopped but is to be suspended in its current position, a brake is usually used. The "load suspension" safety function is one of the most important among the many different applications. In the safety module SE6, the "load suspension" safety function can be implemented by using the SBC and SBT safety functions.

In addition to safe suspension, the SBC and SBT safety functions can also reduce the risk of other applications that make use of mechanical brakes, such as when stopping high mass inertias.

### 5.9.1 Definition of the "load suspension" safety function

The "load suspension" safety function is a technical measure to prevent unintended sagging of loads.

Gravity-loaded axes must be kept in position:

- During normal operation
- During interrupted operation




Fig.: Overview of "load suspension" during normal and interrupted operation

## 5.9.2 Standby current-operated, mechanical brakes

### 5.9.2.1 Safety components

Mechanical brakes supplied by the manufacturer for stopping are deemed to be safety components in terms of the Machinery Directive, provided they are placed on the market separately.

The manufacturer provides the following documents together with the brake:

- ▶ A declaration of conformity
- ▶ Installation instructions
- ▶ A safety manual for intended use in safety-related applications

### 5.9.2.2 **Standard components**

(Brakes without safety-related assessment by the manufacturer)

Brakes are frequently used as standard components in safety functions.

In this case the user must perform safety-related monitoring in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1 and provide proof that the brakes meet the following requirements:

- ▶ All requirements of the PL r related to the "Load suspension" safety function

Other essential measures are as follows:

- ▶ Appropriate design of the brake
- ▶ Fault detection measures, such as a brake test

### 5.9.2.3 **Motor brakes**

Motor brakes (motor-integrated brakes) cannot be sold separately. This means that they cannot be sold independently from the motor. They can therefore not be categorised as a safety component in accordance with the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC.

## 5.9.3 **Options of "Load suspension" implementation**

The safety module SE6 offers the option

- ▶ To activate quiescent current-activated, mechanical brakes.
- ▶ To activate an external safe device for load suspension.

The safety module SE6 provides functions and interfaces that permit the user to implement "load suspension" in various ways.

The implementation concept is determined by:

- ▶ The specifications for mechanical brakes  
(depending on the load to be suspended, mounting location, etc.)
- ▶ The required performance level (PL r)
- ▶ The required category
- ▶ The test options

The following requirements can be derived from the specified mechanical brakes:

- ▶ Activation of the brakes  
(voltages, currents, performance drop, emergency shutdown, etc.)
- ▶ Fault detection measures

### 5.9.3.1 **Safety module has direct control of quiescent current-activated mechanical brakes**

During performance triggering, the brakes are connected to the 2-pole hardware outputs of the safety module.




Fig.: Performance trigger for standby current-operated, mechanical brakes

**Legend**

- F Optional feedback
- A Performance trigger
- B Standby current-operated, mechanical brake
- P Driven system (for example a gravity-loaded axis)

**5.9.3.2 Triggering an external safe system**

If an external safe device is used, this can be activated via the 1-pole safe hardware outputs of the safety module, as an alternative to 2-pole activation. These outputs must be allocated to the SBC safety function.




Fig.: Activation of an external safe device

**Legend**

- F Optional feedback
- A Trigger signal
- SM Safe device to stop and suspend loads
- P Driven system (for example a gravity-loaded axis)


## 5.9.4 Examples

### General information about the examples:

The safety integrity tables indicate the maximum achievable categories according to EN ISO 13849-1.

No performance levels can be indicated, as the failure rates and the mechanical requirements differ from application to application.

### The following requirements apply to all "Load suspension" examples:

- ▶ To detect a hazardous movement (e.g. sagging of the load to be suspended), it is essential that a save movement function (e.g. SLS, SOS, etc.) should be active. In the event of an error, this will trigger an error reaction function and activate the STO safety function.
- ▶ To ensure that a brake is activated if the STO safety function is active, thus stopping the hazardous movement, at least one SBC safety function must be configured (see [Safe Brake Control \(SBC\)](#) [ 128]).
- ▶ An error analysis must be carried out for the mechanical brake used. This must be performed for each application.
- ▶ An error analysis must be carried out for the driven system. This must be performed for each application.

**5.9.4.1 "Load suspension" with an external brake (standard component)**

Triggering of a standby current-activated, mechanical brake by the 2-pole SBC+/- output (X8) with or without ventilation monitoring (feedback).




Fig.: "Load suspension" with an external brake (brake 2) (standard component)

**Legend**

- M Motor
- F Optional ventilation monitoring (feedback)
- - - Dotted line, optional
- ExB External, standby current-operated, mechanical brake (brake 2)
- P Driven system (for example a gravity-loaded axis)

Max. category in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1	1	2
Active stop function or safety function for motion monitoring	Essential	Essential
SBC (Safe Brake Control)	Essential	Essential
SBC ventilation monitoring feedback	optional	optional
SBT (Safe Brake Test) Test interval according to EN ISO 13849-1 (requirement rate $\leq 1/100$ of test rate or testing takes place immediately when required by the safety function)	Not required	Essential
Categorisation of the brake as a proven component (Cat. 1)	Essential	Not required
Categorisation of the brake as a safety component	Not required	Not required

**The following notes apply:**

- ▶ A mechanical brake must be used to achieve Category 1 according to EN ISO 13849-1. This must be categorised as a proven component.
- ▶ If necessary, ventilation monitoring of the brake can be evaluated by the SBC safety function.
- ▶ If Category 2 according to EN ISO 13849-1 is to be achieved, the SBT safety function in the safety module SE6 must be configured and the brake must be tested.



**5.9.4.2 "Load suspension" with a motor brake (standard component)**

Triggering of a standby current-activated, mechanical motor brake by the 2-pole SBC+/- output (X8).




Fig.: "Load suspension" with a motor brake

**Legend**

- MB Standby current-operated mechanical motor brake
- P Driven system (for example a gravity-loaded axis)

Max. category in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1	1	2
Active stop function or safety function for motion monitoring	Essential	Essential
SBC (Safe Brake Control)	Essential	Essential
SBC ventilation monitoring feedback	Not required	Not required
SBT (Safe Brake Test) Test interval according to EN ISO 13849-1 (requirement rate $\leq 1/100$ of test rate or testing takes place immediately when required by the safety function)	Not required	Essential
Categorisation of the brake as a proven component (Cat. 1)	Essential	Not required
Categorisation of the brake as a safety component	Not required	Not required

**The following notes apply:**

- ▶ A mechanical brake must be used to achieve Category 1 according to EN ISO 13849-1. This must be categorised as a proven component.
- ▶ If Category 2 according to EN ISO 13849-1 is to be achieved, the SBT safety function in the safety module SE6 must be configured and the brake must be tested.

**5.9.4.3 "Load suspension" with an external safety brake (safety component)**

Triggering of an external, standby current-activated, mechanical safety brake by the 2-pole SBC+/- output (X8).




Fig.: "Load suspension" with an external safety brake (safety component)

**Legend**

- F Optional ventilation monitoring
- SB External, standby current-operated, mechanical safety brake
- - - Dotted line, optional
- P Driven system (for example a gravity-loaded axis)

Max. category in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1	4
Active stop function or safety function for motion monitoring	Essential
SBC (Safe Brake Control)	Essential
SBC ventilation monitoring feedback	optionally
SBT (Safe Brake Test)	optionally
Categorisation of the brake as a proven component (Cat. 1)	Not required
Categorisation of the brake as a safety component	Essential

**The following notes apply:**

- ▶ If a mechanical brake categorised as a safety component is used, a maximum of Category 4 according to EN ISO 13849-1 can be achieved.
- ▶ The brake requirements in accordance with the installation instructions/ safety manual must be taken into account.
- ▶ Depending on the requirements, the SBT safety function and the ventilation monitoring system may be used.

**5.9.4.4 "Load suspension" by triggering an external system**

Triggering an external safe system for load suspension, using safe 1-pole hardware outputs and optional evaluation of feedback signals.




Fig.: "Load suspension" by triggering an external system


**Legend**

SM Safe system for load suspension

Max. category in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1	4
Active stop function or safety function for motion monitoring	Essential
SBC (Safe Brake Control)	Essential
SBC ventilation monitoring feedback	optional
SBT (Safe Brake Test)	optional
Categorisation of the brake as a proven component (Cat. 1)	optional
Categorisation of the brake as a safety component	optional

**The following notes apply:**

- ▶ The safety module SE6 only generates trigger signals for activation of the "Load suspension" safety function.
- ▶ If necessary, feedback signals from the system can be evaluated by the safety module SE6 .

- ▶ Error monitoring of brakes, performance trigger and the driven system must be covered by the external system.
- ▶ The external system should be regarded as a separate, safety-related subsystem (SRP/CS according to EN ISO 13849-1).
- ▶ The achievable category depends on the characteristics of the safe, external brake controls.
- ▶ Please take note of the chapter on [Feedback of the safety functions via hardware inputs](#) [ 30] to prevent and detect errors due to overvoltage.

Apply the measures in Chapter [Application of the SBC and SBT safe brake functions](#) [ 58].

### 5.9.4.5 "Load suspension" with two brakes

Triggering a standby current-activated, mechanical motor brake and an external standby current-activated brake.




Fig.: "Load suspension" with two brakes

#### Legend

- F Optional ventilation monitoring
- B Triggering BD1/BD2 for STO
- ExB External, standby current-operated, mechanical brake
- MB Standby current-operated mechanical motor brake
- P Driven system (for example a gravity-loaded axis)

Max. category in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1	4
Active stop function or safety function for motion monitoring	Essential
SBC (Safe Brake Control)	Essential
SBC ventilation monitoring feedback	optionally
SBT (Safe Brake Test)	Essential
Categorisation of the brakes as a proven component (Cat. 1)	Not required
Categorisation of the brakes as a safety component	Not required

#### The following notes apply:

- ▶ When using two brakes in combination with the SBT safety function, a "Load suspension" up to Category 4 in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1 can be achieved.

- ▶ Brakes must meet the basic requirements of the application (momentum, temperature, environment, vibration, etc.).
- ▶ Brakes must be employed in accordance with the intended use as prescribed by the manufacturer.



**5.9.4.6 "Load suspension" with a motor brake and an external system**

Triggering a standby current-activated, mechanical motor brake and an external safe system.





Fig.: "Load suspension" with a motor brake and an external safe system

**Legend**

- F Optional ventilation monitoring
- SM Safe system for load suspension
- MB Standby current-operated mechanical motor brake

Max. category in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1	4
Active stop function or safety function for motion monitoring	Essential
SBC (Safe Brake Control)	Essential
SBC ventilation monitoring feedback	optionally
SBT (Safe Brake Test)	Essential
Categorisation of the brake as a proven component (Cat. 1)	Not required
Categorisation of the brake as a safety component	optionally

**The following notes apply:**

- ▶ The safety module SE6 only generates trigger signals for activation of the "Load suspension" safety function for the external system.
- ▶ If necessary, feedback signals from the system can be evaluated by the safety module SE6 .
- ▶ The external system should be regarded as a separate, safety-related subsystem (SRP/CS according to EN ISO 13849-1).
- ▶ A separate error evaluation must be carried out for the components included in the safe system (e.g. brake, performance trigger, driven system, etc.)
- ▶ Please take note of the chapter on [Feedback of the safety functions via hardware inputs](#)  [30](#)] to prevent and detect errors due to overvoltage.
- ▶ Brakes must meet the basic requirements of the application (momentum, temperature, environment, vibration, etc.).
- ▶ Brakes must be employed in accordance with the intended use as prescribed by the manufacturer.

### 5.9.5 Procedure when determining the safety integrity

The "Load suspension" safety function consists of several safety-related components. These components differ from application to application.

This operating manual contains the following information and help functions:

- ▶ Typical examples for implementation using a maximum achievable category
- ▶ Description of the safety functions of the safety module SE6
- ▶ Safety characteristics of the safety module SE6
- ▶ Description of test functions for error detection

In addition, the following values must be determined for the mechanical brakes:

- ▶  $MTTF_D$  values
- ▶ Diagnostic coverage (DC)

The safety module provides the following error detection functions:

- Safe Brake Test (SBT)
- Evaluation of feedback signals by the SBC safety function

## 5.10 Safety functions

Safety functions maintain a safe condition on a plant or prevent hazardous conditions arising on a plant.

Safety functions for electrical drives are defined in EN 61800-5-2.

### Configuration of safety functions in the configuration tool

A maximum of 10 safety functions can be configured in the configuration tool, using function blocks. In addition, the safety function safe stop 1 (SS1) must always be configured.

The safety function SS1 cannot be deactivated in the configurator. The input for safety function SS1 on the safety module must always be connected.


All safety functions must be configured individually.

The following function blocks for safety functions can only be used once:

- ▶ Safe stop 1 (SS1), a fixed component of the safety configuration
- ▶ Safe restart interlock (SRL)
- ▶ Safe status output (SSO)
- ▶ Safe brake test (SBT)
- ▶ Safe brake control, 2-pole (SBC)

The other function blocks for the safety functions can be used as many times as desired (limited only by the maximum number of safety functions).

### External activation of safety functions

- ▶ The safety functions are activated with the 1-pole safe hardware inputs of the safety module SE6, see [Activation of the safety functions via hardware inputs](#)  28].
- ▶ These inputs operate in accordance with the standby current principle. The programmable safety system activates the safety functions via a 0 signal.

### Feedback from the safety functions

- ▶ Message via 1-pole semiconductor outputs
  - 1-signal: If monitoring has been activated and within the parametrised limit values
  - 0-signal: If monitoring has been deactivated and outside the parametrised limit values


### Simultaneous activation of safety functions

- ▶ All safety functions can be active at the same time. However, safety function SS1 has priority over all other safety functions.
- ▶ If SS1 is activated, the drive is stopped in accordance with its configuration.
- ▶ No other safety functions are processed or called up during this time.

### Reaction to limit value violations and errors

- ▶ When the parametrised limit values are exceeded (FAULT), the SS1 safety function is triggered with the aid of the emergency stop deceleration ramp and the feedback output of the safety function is switched to the 0 signal.

- ▶ When parametrised limit values are exceeded for monitoring functions (FAULT), only the feedback output of the safety function is switched to the 0 signal.
- ▶ In the event of an internal fault (FAULT) of the safety module SE6 , the SS1 safety function is triggered with the emergency stop deceleration ramp.
- ▶ In the event of a serious fault (FATAL), for example an internal memory or data fault, the STO safety function is directly activated. The torque or force generation in the motor is prevented. The safety module can only be restarted once it has been switched off and on again and can only continue to be operated if the fault is not permanent.

For further information see [Operating states](#)  177].

### 5.10.1 Permanent monitoring (optional)

Permanent monitoring means the motion and monitoring functions are permanently activated. With permanent monitoring of a safety function configured, this is active after run-up of the safety module. The safety module then automatically switches to the FSRUN state. Activation or deactivation at runtime is not possible.

- ▶ The safety function is monitored without an activation signal and permanently without a delay time.
- ▶ No external wiring is necessary.

#### Parameter monitoring can be configured for the following safety functions

##### Motion functions

- ▶ Safe Direction (SDI)
- ▶ Safely Limited Speed (SLS)
- ▶ Safe Speed Range (SSR)
- ▶ Safely Limited Position (SLP)

##### Monitoring functions

- ▶ Safely Monitored Direction (SDI-M)
- ▶ Safely Monitored Speed (SLS-M)
- ▶ Safely Monitored Speed Range (SSR-M)
- ▶ Safely Monitored Position (SLP-M)

#### Configuration of permanent monitoring in the configuration tool

Field: Permanent monitoring			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Permanent monitoring	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activates permanent monitoring



#### INFORMATION

##### **Permanent monitoring for the safety function SLP**

The situation may arise where the drive can no longer be moved back into the valid range in a controlled manner when it has left the valid position range. The safety module cannot be reset while the axis is in the invalid range.

Possible remedy:


The axis is returned mechanically (manually) to the valid range if this is technically feasible.

Alternatively permanent monitoring of the safety function must be dispensed with and activation can be performed via an input. In this case the safety function can be deactivated and the axis moved back into the permitted range.



#### INFORMATION

##### **Hysteresis (optional)**

If the **permanent monitoring option** has been selected in the configurator of a monitoring function, it is mandatory to select the hysteresis option (see [Hysteresis for monitoring functions](#) [ 150]).

The Set/Reset function (default) is then not possible.


## 5.10.2 Safe torque off, STO

The STO safety function prevents torque or force generation in the motor. It is redundantly designed via two safe shutdown paths on the safety module. To prevent the motor running down in an uncontrolled manner, in normal operation the safety function STO is activated via the SS1 safety function. The STO safety function forms part of the SS1 safety function and is also configured via this function.

- ▶ The STO safety function corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.
- ▶ The STO safety function corresponds to a category 0 stop (uncontrolled stop) in accordance with EN 60204-1.
- ▶ An emergency stop in accordance with EN ISO 13850 can be realised with the STO safety function.
- ▶ The STO safety function can be used to prevent an unexpected start-up in accordance with ISO 14118 after the power supply has been switched off.
- ▶ A safety stop in accordance with EN ISO 10218-1 can be realised with the STO safety function.


### Activation of the STO safety function


The safety function STO can be activated in a variety of ways:

- ▶ During normal operation, through external activation at the optional activation input STO\_ACT of the SS1 safety function, see [Safe stop 1 \(SS1\)](#)  83].
- ▶ During normal operation or in the event of an error, when the SS1 safety function is activated, once standstill has been detected or the monitoring time has elapsed.
- ▶ In the event of an error, as an error reaction of the brake ramp monitoring of the SS1 safety function.
- ▶ In the event of FATAL errors


When the STO safety function has been activated, the safety module switches to the operating state STO, see [Operating states](#)  177].

### Interaction with safe brake control (SBC)

If any external forces influence the motor axis (e.g. suspended loads), additional measures (e.g. a standby current brake) are required. This is to avoid hazards when the STO safety function is active, see [Application of the SBC and SBT safe brake functions](#)  58]. The SBC safety function in the configuration tool must be configured for this purpose. If the STO safety function has been activated, the output is set to a 0-signal (brake activation). If the STO safety function is switched off, the hardware output of the SBC safety function is triggered, in accordance with its configuration (configuration: linking to the brake trigger signal of the Drive controller active or not). For ventilation purposes, the hardware output is set to the 1-signal (brake is ventilated).

For further information about the SBC safety function, see [Safe Brake Control \(SBC\)](#)  128].

### Activation inputs and feedback outputs of the STO safety function

The activation inputs and feedback outputs of the STO safety function form part of the SS1 safety function and are described in the chapter [Safe stop 1 \(SS1\)](#)  83].





**NOTICE**

**STO operating status**

In the STO operating status, a 0 signal is output at all feedback outputs of the configured safety functions.

Exceptions:

Feedback output STO\_ACK of the safety function SS1 reports the active status STO with a 1 signal.

Feedback output SBT\_SBA of the safety function SBT remains set throughout the inspection period.




Fig.: Safety function STO

**Legend**

- v            Speed
- I            Current, torque/force generation
- $t_1$         Activation of the safety function STO
- SS1\_ACT    Input for activation of the SS1 safety function
- STO\_ACT    Input for activation of the STO safety function.  
Activation input STO\_ACT (optional)  
Input required as a second shutdown path to achieve SIL3/PLe.
- STO\_ACK    Output for feedback from safety function STO
- SS1\_ACK    Output for feedback from safety function SS1

### 5.10.3 Safe stop 1 (SS1)

The safety function SS1 triggers braking of the motor to a standstill. The safety function STO is then performed and the motor is switched to torque-free/force-free.

- ▶ The safety function SS1 corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.
- ▶ The safety function SS1 corresponds to a category 1 stop, a controlled stop in accordance with EN 60204-1.
- ▶ The safety function SS1 is relevant for calculation of overrun in accordance with EN ISO 13855.
- ▶ A safety stop in accordance with EN ISO 10218-1 can be realised with the safety function SS1.

The safety function must always be contained in a configuration. It cannot be used multiple times.

A RESET of the safety module can be carried out via the inputs of the safety function SS1 (see [Resetting \(RESET\) the safety module](#) [ 52]).

#### Activating safety function SS1

The safety function SS1 can be deactivated in a variety of ways:

- ▶ Normally by external activation at the activation input SS1\_ACT.
- ▶ In the event of an error as a reaction upon limit value violation by other safety functions.
- ▶ In the event of an error as a reaction to an internal error in the safety module.


#### Stop motor in normal operation and in the event of an error

Both in normal operation and in the event of an error, the control of the brake ramp to stop the motor is either

- ▶ Drive-activated - by the Drive controller, or
- ▶ Controller-activated – by a higher-level controller

#### Configuration of the safety function SS1 in the configuration tool

Field: Stop function		
Input field	Options	Description
Stop function	Drive-activated (internal) (default)	Control of the brake ramp drive-activated
	Controller-activated (external)	Control of the brake ramp controller-activated



### Drive-activated brake ramp

The safety module

- ▶ Transmits the brake ramp (normal operation or in event of error) to the Drive controller.
- ▶ Starts the braking process in the Drive controller.
- ▶ Monitors the braking process (optional).

Setpoints for a higher-level controller are ignored by the Drive controller while the safety function SS1 is active



#### NOTICE

##### Drive-activated brake ramp

With a drive-activated stop, axes lose their synchrony if the axes form a synchronous axis system via the controller.

Compensation movements of the motor may occur on the controller upon restarting.

### Controller-activated brake ramp

The safety module

- ▶ Provides the brake ramp (normal operation or in the event of an error) for a higher-level controller via the fieldbus connection of the Drive controller.
- ▶ Provides the signal for starting the braking process of a higher-level controller via the fieldbus connection of the Drive controller.
- ▶ Monitors the braking process (optional).

### Information on drive controller/control system fieldbus communication

See chapter [Field bus communication](#) [ 186].

### Brake ramp for normal operation

Normally the motor brakes according to the brake ramp that can be set in the configuration tool.

### Brake ramp in event of an error

In the event of an error the motor brakes according to the E-STOP brake ramp that can be set in the configuration tool.

### Configuration of the safety function SS1 in the configuration tool

Field: Brake ramp			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Brake ramp ( $a_{dec}$ )	0 ... 2147483647 (default: 50000000)	User-defined [default: increments/s <sup>2</sup> ]	Brake ramp gradient for normal operation
E-STOP brake ramp ( $a_{emergencyDec}$ )	0 ... 2147483647 (default: 50000000)	User-defined [default: increments/s <sup>2</sup> ]	E-STOP brake ramp gradient



#### INFORMATION

When braking ramp monitoring is activated, the valid input range of the braking ramp is reduced to 2 ... 2147483647.



#### INFORMATION

The braking period always depends on the speed of the motor when braking is started.

### Activate STO

(see [Safe torque off, STO](#) [ 80])

The safety function STO can be activated in a variety of ways:

- ▶ After a configured delay time has elapsed in normal operation
- ▶ After a configured delay time has elapsed in the event of an error
- ▶ After a configurable speed limit has been undercut (optional)
- ▶ Directly via the activation input STO\_ACT (see Activation and feedback)



**INFORMATION**

The STO is activated at the very latest after the delay time has elapsed. The safety margins in the application must be based on the safe delay time.



**NOTICE**

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details](#) [188]) will not elapse until the following system cycle.

**Configuration of the safety function SS1 in the configuration tool**

Field: Delay time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
STO delay time ( $t_{del}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 100)	[ms]	Delay time for normal operation between activation of SS1 and shutdown with STO.
E-STOP delay time ( $t_{emergencyDel}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 50)	[ms]	Delay time for E-STOP after an error leading to shutdown with STO.

**Automatic STO**

Using the "Automatic STO" option, the safety function STO can be activated before the delay time has elapsed as follows:

- ▶ The motor speed must fall below a configured standstill limit value.
- ▶ At a standstill limit value of 0, the software controller enable must be evaluated.  
In other words if the controller enable is withdrawn, the safety function STO is activated.

This option is active in both normal operation and in the event of an error.

**Configuration of the safety function SS1 in the configuration tool**

Field: Automatic STO			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Automatic STO	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activating the automatic STO.
Limit value standstill ( $V_{lim}$ )	0 ... 16777215  (default: 340)	User-defined  [default: increments/s]	If the standstill limit value is undercut, the safety function STO is triggered.

**Monitoring of brake ramp**

The safety function SS1 offers the option of identifying a hazardous movement at an early point by monitoring the brake ramp. By means of a target/actual comparison of the motor position curve during the braking process, an error reaction is initiated if a configurable position error is exceeded.

**In the event of an error there are the following options**

- ▶ For a drive-activated brake ramp, the safety function STO is triggered directly.
- ▶ For a controller-activated brake ramp, either the safety function STO or the E-STOP brake ramp (drive-activated) can be triggered directly.

**Configuration of the safety function SS1 in the configuration tool**

Field: Monitoring of brake ramp			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Monitor brake ramp	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activating brake ramp monitoring
Position error ( $pos_{err}$ )	0 ... 2147483647 (default: 0)	User-defined [default: increments]	Maximum permitted position error
Error reaction	STO	--	For controller-activated brake ramp, direct triggering of the safety function STO
	E-STOP brake ramp	--	For controller-activated brake ramp, triggering of the E-STOP brake ramp (drive-activated)

### Activation and feedback

For activation and feedback of the safety function SS1, the following activation and feedback signals of the function can be routed to safe inputs and outputs:




Fig.: Safety function SS1

### Legend

- SS1\_ACT     The safety function SS1 is activated or deactivated via the activation input SS1\_ACT.  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)
- STO\_ACT     The safety function STO is activated or deactivated via the activation input STO\_ACT.  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)
- SS1\_ACK     The feedback output SS1\_ACK reports whether the safety function SS1 is activated or deactivated.  
(1 signal activated, 0 signal deactivated)
- STO\_ACK     The feedback output STO\_ACK reports whether the safety function STO is activated or deactivated.  
(1 signal activated, 0 signal deactivated)

### Activation input STO\_ACT (optional)

- ▶ The safety function STO is activated directly via the activation input STO\_ACT.  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)

The activation input STO\_ACT may be necessary for the following reasons:

- ▶ Direct triggering of the safety function STO by a higher-level control system.
- ▶ Second shutdown path for the higher-level control system if no error exclusion for activation can be applied.

### Configuration of the safety function SS1 in the configuration tool

Field: IO activation			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Activate STO input	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Use of activation input for STO





**NOTICE**

The safety function SS1 is a fixed component of the safety configuration. When the safety function SS1 is activated, one axis loses its synchrony with other axes in a synchronous axis system. Safety function SS1 is present precisely once in every safety configuration.

**Activation of brake output BD1/BD2 (X5) of the drive controller by the safety module (optional)**

If safe activation is required for two quiescent current-activated brakes, this can be implemented as follows:

- ▶ Activation of the first quiescent current-activated brake by the safe brake output SBC+/SBC- of the safety module
- ▶ Activation of the second quiescent current-activated brake by the brake output BD1/BD2 of the drive controller

**Function**

The first brake on the SBC+/SBC- output is activated via the safety function SBC (see [Safe Brake Control \(SBC\)](#) [128]).

Parameters can be set for activation of the second brake on the BD1/BD2 output.

The parameters are set by the configuration tool in the safety function SS1.

**Configuration of the brake output BD1/BD2 of the drive controller in the configuration tool**

Field: Brake output BD1/BD2			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Drive-controlled (not safety-related)	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	<p><b>Function activated:</b> The drive controller has control over the brake output at all times. In the STO state, the brake BD1/BD2 can be released by the drive controller.</p> <p><b>Function deactivated:</b> In the STO state, the brake BD1/BD2 cannot be released by the drive controller.</p>



**WARNING!**

**Possible loss of the safety function**

An optional configuration may result in loss of the safety function. If the second brake at output BD1/BD2 is used in a safety function, the function "Activation of BD1/BD2 by drive controller (not safety-related)" must be deactivated.




Fig.: Timing diagram: SS1 with STO once the STO delay time has elapsed

**Legend**

$a_{dec}$	Brake ramp
v	Speed
$t_{del}$	STO delay time
$t_1$	Activation of the safety function SS1
$t_2$	Activation of the safety function STO
SS1_ACT	Input for safety function SS1
SS1_ACK	Output for feedback from safety function SS1

STO\_ACK Output for feedback from safety function STO




Fig.: Timing diagram: SS1 with automatic STO if standstill detected and brake ramp monitored

### Legend

$a_{dec}$	Brake ramp
pos	Position
v	Speed
$t_{del}$	STO delay time
pos <sub>err</sub>	Position error
v <sub>lim</sub>	Standstill limit value
t <sub>1</sub>	Activation of the safety function SS1
t <sub>2</sub>	Activation of the safety function STO
SS1_ACT	Input for safety function SS1
SS1_ACK	Output for feedback from safety function SS1
STO_ACK	Output for feedback from safety function STO

### 5.10.4 Safe Stop 2 (SS2)

The safety function SS2 triggers braking of the motor to a standstill. The motor is then monitored for a safe standstill (SOS).

- ▶ The safety function SS2 corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.
- ▶ The safety function SS2 corresponds to a category 2 stop, a controlled stop in accordance with EN 60204-1.
- ▶ The safety function SS2 is relevant for calculation of overrun in accordance with EN ISO 13855.
- ▶ A safety stop in accordance with EN ISO 10218-1 can be realised with the safety function SS2.

The safety function can be used as many times as desired (limited only by the maximum number of safety functions).



**NOTICE**

Avoid activating several SS2 safety functions with differently configured brake ramps simultaneously. In this case it is not clearly defined what SS2 brake ramp is executed.

#### Activation of safety function SS2

The safety function SS2 can be activated in the following way:

- ▶ By external activation at the activation input ACT.


#### Stop motor

Control of the brake ramp to stop the motor is either:

- ▶ Drive-activated - by the Drive controller, or
- ▶ Controller-activated – by a higher-level controller

#### Configuration of the safety function SS2 in the configuration tool

Field: Stop function		
Input field	Options	Description
Stop function	Drive-activated (internal) (default)	Control of the brake ramp drive-activated
	Controller-activated (external)	Control of the brake ramp controller-activated



### Drive-activated brake ramp

The safety module

- ▶ Transmits the brake ramp (normal operation) to the Drive controller.
- ▶ Starts the braking process in the Drive controller.
- ▶ Monitors the braking process (optional).

Setpoints for a higher-level controller are ignored by the Drive controller while the safety function SS2 is active



#### NOTICE

#### Drive-activated brake ramp

With a drive-activated stop, axes lose their synchrony if the axes form a synchronous axis system via the controller.

Compensation movements of the motor may occur on the controller upon restarting.

### Controller-activated brake ramp

The safety module

- ▶ Provides the brake ramp (normal operation or in the event of an error) for a higher-level controller via the fieldbus connection of the Drive controller.
- ▶ Provides the signal for starting the braking process of a higher-level controller via the fieldbus connection of the Drive controller.
- ▶ Monitors the braking process (optional).

Alternatively, the brake ramp can be set in the controller itself.

**Information on drive controller/control system fieldbus communication**

See chapter [Field bus communication](#) [ 186].

**Braking ramp for normal operation**

Normally the motor brakes in accordance with the braking ramp that can be set in the configuration tool.

**Configuration of the safety function SS2 in the configuration tool**

Field: Braking ramp			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Braking ramp ( $a_{dec}$ )	0 ... 2147483647  (default: 10000000)	User-defined  [default: increments/s <sup>2</sup> ]	Braking ramp gradient for normal operation



**INFORMATION**

When braking ramp monitoring is activated, the valid input range of the braking ramp is reduced to 2 ... 2147483647.

**Braking ramp monitoring**

The safety function SS2 offers the option of identifying a hazardous movement at an early stage by monitoring the braking ramp. By means of a setpoint/actual comparison of the motor position curve during the braking process, an error reaction is triggered if a configurable position error is exceeded.

**Configuration of the safety function SS2 in the configuration tool**

Field: Braking ramp monitoring			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Monitor braking ramp	Activate/deactivate  (default: deactivated)	--	Activating braking ramp monitoring
Position error ( $pos_{err}$ )	0 ... 2147483647  (default: 0)	User-defined  [default: increments]	Maximum permitted position error



**INFORMATION**

The braking period always depends on the speed of the motor when braking is started.

### Activate SOS

The safety function SOS can be activated in a variety of ways:

- ▶ After a configured delay time has elapsed
- ▶ If a set speed limit has been undercut (optional)



#### INFORMATION

The SOS is activated at the very latest after the delay time has elapsed.



#### NOTICE

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details \[188\]](#)) will not elapse until the following system cycle.

### Configuration of the safety function SS2 in the configuration tool

Field: Delay time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
SOS delay time ( $t_{del}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 100)	[ms]	Delay time between activation of SS2 and monitored standstill with SOS.

### Monitoring

- ▶ The actual position of the motor is continuously compared with the set standstill position window.  
If it is seen to be exceeded, an error reaction is triggered.

### Configuration of the safety function SS2 in the configuration tool

Field: Position limit values			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Standstill position window ( $pos_{win}$ )	0 ... 2147483647  (default: 100)	User-defined [default: increments]	If the limit value is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP braking ramp) is activated.

### Automatic SOS (optional)

With automatic SOS, the safety function SOS is activated before the delay time has elapsed. For this to occur, the motor speed must fall below a configurable standstill limit value.

### Configuration of the safety function SS2 in the configuration tool

Field: Automatic SOS			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Automatic SOS	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activating the automatic SOS.
Limit value standstill ( $V_{lim}$ )	0 ... 16777215  (default: 340)	User-defined  [default: increments/s]	If the standstill limit value is undercut, the safety function SOS is triggered.

### Error reaction with activated SOS

If a limit value violation is identified during standstill monitoring, the safety function SS1 is triggered as a reaction.

### Activation and feedback

For activation and feedback of the safety function SS2, the following activation and feedback signals of the function can be routed to safe inputs and outputs:




Fig.: Safety function SS2

### Legend

- ACT      The safety function SS2 is activated or deactivated via the activation input ACT.  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)
- ACK      The feedback output ACK reports whether the safety function SS2 is activated or deactivated.  
(1 signal activated, 0 signal deactivated)
- SSA      Safe Standstill Acknowledge  
  
The feedback output SSA reports whether the motor is at a standstill (1 signal), or whether there is a limit value violation (0 signal). If the safety function SS2 is not activated, the feedback output likewise reports a 0 signal.






Fig.: Safety function SS2

### Legend

$a_{dec}$	Brake ramp
pos	Position
v	Speed
$pos_{win}$	Standstill position window
$pos_{err}$	Position error
$v_{lim}$	Standstill limit value
$t_{del}$	SOS delay time
$t_1$	Activation of safety function SS2
$t_2$	Activation of safety function SOS
ACT	Input for safety function SS2
ACK	Output for feedback from safety function SS2
SSA	Safe Standstill Acknowledge Output for feedback from limit value monitoring

### 5.10.5 Safe Direction (SDI) and Safely Monitored Direction (SDI-M)



#### INFORMATION

The **monitoring function SDI-M "Safely Monitored Direction"** can be selected as a variant of the normative safety function SDI "Safe Direction". The monitoring function SDI-M corresponds to the normative safety function SDI except for the error reaction.

When parameterised limit values are exceeded:

- no SS1 is triggered
- a 0 signal is issued at the SDA (Safe Direction Acknowledge) output


The safety function SDI monitors whether the motor's motion complies with a defined direction. To monitor the positive and negative direction, the SDI function must be used twice.

- ▶ The safety function SDI corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.
- ▶ Safe axial and spatial boundaries in accordance with EN ISO 10218-1 can be realised with the safety function SDI.

The safety function can be used as many times as desired (limited only by the maximum number of safety functions).

#### Activation of safety function SDI

The safety function SDI can be activated in the following way:


- ▶ By external activation at the activation input ACT
- ▶ **Permanent monitoring (optional)**  [78]
  - The direction is monitored without an activation signal and permanently, without an SDI delay time.
  - No external wiring is necessary.

#### Start of monitoring

- ▶ Once the SDI delay time has elapsed, monitoring of the direction starts.
- ▶ Once the SDI delay time has elapsed, the feedback output SDA becomes active (see diagram).





#### NOTICE

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details](#)  [188]) will not elapse until the following system cycle.

**Configuration of the safety function SDI in the configuration tool**

Field: Delay time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Delay time ( $t_{del}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 20)	[ms]	Time between activation of the safety function SDI and the point at which monitoring begins

Information clockwise/anti-clockwise	
	<p><b>Clockwise</b> ⇒ positive direction The shaft rotates clockwise looking at the drive end.</p>
	<p><b>Anti-clockwise</b> ⇒ negative direction The shaft rotates anti-clockwise looking at the drive end.</p>

**Monitoring**

- ▶ The motor's direction of rotation is continuously compared with the parameterised, permitted direction (positive or negative).
- ▶ A user-specific position window prevents limit value violation caused by minimal movements around the standstill position.
- ▶ The position window is drawn behind the actual position provided the motor is turning in the permitted direction.
- ▶ If there is a movement in the impermissible direction that exceeds the distance set in the position window, the SS1 function is triggered.

**Configuration of the safety function SDI in the configuration tool**

Field: Direction			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Safely monitored direction	Negative (default)	--	Determination of permitted direction
	Positive	--	

Field: Standstill position			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Standstill position window (pos <sub>win</sub> )	0 ... 2147483647  (default: 100)	User-defined  [default: increments]	If the limit value is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP brake ramp) is activated.

**SDI error reaction**

- ▶ If the limit value is exceeded, safety function SS1 is triggered.
- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the SDA feedback output.

**SDI-M error reaction**

- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the feedback output SDA if the limit value is exceeded.

**Activation and feedback**

For activation and feedback of the safety function SDI, the following activation and feedback signals of the function can be routed to safe inputs and outputs:




Fig.: Function block SDI

**Legend**

- ACT**      The safety function SDI is activated or deactivated via the activation input ACT.  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)
- SDA**      Safe Direction Acknowledge  
  
The feedback output SDA reports whether the motor is within its permitted limit values (1 signal), or whether there is a limit value violation (0 signal). If the safety function is not activated, the feedback output likewise reports a 0 signal.




Fig.: Safety function SDI

**Legend**

- pos            Position
- v              Speed
- pos<sub>win</sub>       Standstill position window
- t<sub>del</sub>          Delay time
- t<sub>1</sub>            Activation of the safety function SDI
- t<sub>2</sub>            Start of monitoring
- ACT           Input for safety function SDI
- SDA           Safe Direction Acknowledge  
                  Output for feedback from safety function SDI

**Hysteresis for monitoring functions**

A hysteresis can be configured optionally for the monitoring functions, see [Hysteresis for monitoring functions](#) [150].

## 5.10.6 Safely Limited Increment (SLI) and Safely Monitored Increment (SLI-M)



### INFORMATION

The **monitoring function SLI-M "Safely Monitored Increment"** can be selected as a variant of the normative safety function SLI "Safely Monitored Increment".

The monitoring function SLI-M corresponds to the normative safety function SLI except for the error reaction.

When parameterised limit values are exceeded:

- no SS1 is triggered
- a 0 signal is issued at the SRA (Safe Range Acknowledge) output

The safety function SLI monitors whether the motor's motion complies with a defined increment. After activation, the motor may only move within the permitted parameterised position range.

- ▶ The safety function SLI corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.

The safety function can be used as many times as desired (limited only by the maximum number of safety functions).

### Activation of safety function SLI

The safety function SLI can be activated in the following way:

- ▶ By external activation at the activation input ACT

### Start of monitoring

- ▶ Once the SLI delay time has elapsed, the defined increment is monitored.
- ▶ The position after the SLI delay time has elapsed is taken as the start position.
- ▶ Once the SLI delay time has elapsed, the feedback output SRA becomes active (see diagram).





### NOTICE

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details \[188\]](#)) will not elapse until the following system cycle.

**Configuration of the safety function SLI in the configuration tool**

Field: Delay time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Delay time ( $t_{del}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 20)	[ms]	Time between activation of the safety function SLI and the point at which monitoring begins

Information clockwise/anti-clockwise	
	<p><b>Clockwise</b> ⇒ positive direction The shaft rotates clockwise looking at the drive end.</p>
	<p><b>Anti-clockwise</b> ⇒ negative direction The shaft rotates anti-clockwise looking at the drive end.</p>

**Monitoring**

- ▶ The present position of the motor is continuously compared with the set position limit values.  
If it is seen to be exceeded, an error reaction is triggered.

**Configuration of the safety function SLI in the configuration tool**

Field: Increment limit values			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Upper limit value Position (pos <sub>upperLimit</sub> )	0 ..... 2147483647  (default: 0)	User-defined  [default: increments]	If the limit value is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP braking ramp) is activated.
Lower limit value Position (pos <sub>lowerLimit</sub> )	0 ... 2147483647  (default: 0)	User-defined  [default: increments]	If the limit value is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP braking ramp) is activated.

**Error reaction SLI**

- ▶ If a limit value is exceeded, safety function SS1 is activated.
- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the SRA feedback output.

**Error reaction SLI-M**

- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the feedback output SRA if a limit value is exceeded.

**Activation and feedback**

For activation and feedback of the safety function SLI, the following activation and feedback signals of the function can be routed to safe inputs and outputs:




Fig.: Function block SLI

**Legend**

- ACT**      The safety function SLI is activated or deactivated via the activation input ACT,  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)
- SRA**      Safe Range Acknowledge  
  
The feedback output SRA reports whether the motor is within its permitted limit values (1 signal), or whether there is a limit value violation (0 signal). If the safety function is not activated, the feedback output likewise reports a 0 signal.






Fig.: Safety function SLI

### Legend

pos	Position
$pos_{upperLimit}$	Upper limit value position
$pos_{lowerLimit}$	Lower limit value position
$t_{del}$	Delay time
$t_1$	Activation of the safety function SLI
$t_2$	Monitoring start
ACT	Input for safety function SLI
SRA	Safe Range Acknowledge Output for feedback from safety function SLI

### Hysteresis for monitoring functions

A hysteresis can be configured optionally for the monitoring functions, see [Hysteresis for monitoring functions](#) [📖 150].

## 5.10.7 Safely Limited Speed (SLS) and Safely Monitored Speed (SLS-M)



### INFORMATION

The **monitoring function SLS-M "Safely Monitored Speed"** can be selected as a variant of the normative safety function SLS "Safely Limited Speed".

The monitoring function SLS-M corresponds to the normative safety function SLS except for the error reaction.

When parameterised limit values are exceeded:

- no SS1 is triggered
- a 0 signal is issued at the SRA (Safe Range Acknowledge) output


The SLS safety function prevents the motor from exceeding the specified speed limit.

- ▶ The safety function SLS corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.
- ▶ The safety function SLS makes it possible to realise a safety-rated reduced speed and a safety-rated monitored speed in accordance with EN ISO 10218-1.

The safety function can be used as many times as desired (limited only by the maximum number of safety functions).

### Activation of safety function SLS

The safety function SLS can be activated in the following way:


- ▶ By external activation at the activation input ACT
- ▶ **Permanent monitoring (optional)**  78
  - The speed is monitored without an activation signal and permanently, without an SLS delay time.
  - No external wiring is necessary.

### Start of monitoring

- ▶ Once the SLS delay time has elapsed, the speed is monitored.
- ▶ Once the SLS delay time has elapsed, the feedback output SRA becomes active (see diagram).



### NOTICE

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details](#)  188) will not elapse until the following system cycle.

**Configuration of the safety function SLS in the configuration tool**

Field: Delay time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Delay time ( $t_{del}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 20)	[ms]	Time between activation of the safety function SLS and the point at which monitoring begins.

**Monitoring**

- ▶ The actual speed of the motor is continuously compared with the set speed limit value.
- ▶ If it is seen to be exceeded, an error reaction is triggered.

**Configuration of the safety function SLS in the configuration tool**

Field: Speed limit value			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Limit value speed ( $v_{lim}$ )	0 ... 16777215  (default: 100000)	User-defined  [default: increments/s]	If the limit value is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP braking ramp) is activated.

**Error reaction SLS**

- ▶ If the limit value is exceeded, safety function SS1 is triggered.
- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the SRA feedback output.

**Error reaction SLS-M**

- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the feedback output SRA if the limit value is exceeded.

**Activation and feedback**

For activation and feedback of the safety function SLS, the following activation and feedback signals of the function can be routed to safe inputs and outputs:




Fig.: Function block SLS

### Legend

- ACT** The safety function SLS is activated or deactivated via the activation input ACT, (0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)
- SRA** Safe Range Acknowledge  
The feedback output SRA reports whether the motor is within its permitted limit values (1 signal), or whether there is a limit value violation (0 signal). If the safety function is not activated, the feedback output likewise reports a 0 signal.

### Parameterising tolerance range (optional)

A tolerance range may also be set for the limit values used to monitor the speed. This tolerance range modifies the set limit values. As a result, one-off or periodic overshoots that exceed the limit values can be tolerated.

### The following values can be parameterised for the tolerance range

- ▶ Tolerance window, which takes into account the amplitude of the overshoots.
- ▶ Tolerance time, which takes into account the width of the overshoots.
- ▶ Tolerance period, which takes into account the oscillation period.

### Activating the tolerance range

- ▶ If the speed limit value is exceeded, the tolerance range becomes active (see illustration "Safety function SSR with activated tolerance range").

### Reaction

- ▶ If the first tolerance range is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP brake ramp) is activated.

**Configuration of tolerance range in the configuration tool (optional)**

Field: Tolerance			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Tolerance range	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activates the tolerance range
Tolerance window ( $tol_{win}$ )	1 ... 25 (default: 1)	[%]	Permitted amplitude of the overshoots
Tolerance time ( $tol_{t1}$ )	1 ... 120000 (default: 100)	[ms]	Permitted width of the overshoots
Tolerance period ( $tol_{t2}$ )	2 ... 120000 (default: 1000)	[ms]	Permitted period of oscillation




Fig.: Safety function SLS without tolerance range activated

**Legend**

- v                      Speed
- $v_{lim}$                 Speed limit value
- $t_{del}$                  Delay time
- $t_1$                     Activation of the safety function SLS

$t_2$	Monitoring start
ACT	Input for safety function SLS
SRA	Safe Range Acknowledge Output for feedback from safety function SLS





Fig.: Safety function SLS with tolerance window activated

**Legend**

$v$	Speed
$tol_{win}$	Tolerance window
$v_{lim}$	Speed limit value
$t_1$	Activation of the safety function SLS
$t_2$	Monitoring start
$t_s$	Speed $V$ exceeds limit value and lies in the activated tolerance range. (tolerance window, tolerance time, tolerance period)
$t_{del}$	Delay time
$tol_{t1}$	Tolerance time
$tol_{t2}$	Tolerance period
ACT	Input for safety function SLS

SRA            Safe Range Acknowledge  
                  Output for feedback from safety function SLS

**Hysteresis for monitoring functions**

A hysteresis can be configured optionally for the monitoring functions, see [Hysteresis for monitoring functions](#)  150].

### 5.10.8 Safe Operating Stop (SOS) and Safely Monitored Operating Stop (SOS-M)



#### INFORMATION

The **monitoring function SOS-M "Safely Monitored Operating Stop"** can be selected as a variant of the normative safety function SOS "Safe Operating Stop".

The monitoring function SOS-M corresponds to the normative safety function SOS except for the error reaction.

When parameterised limit values are exceeded:

- no SS1 is triggered
- a 0 signal is issued at the SSA (Safe Standstill Acknowledge) output

The safety function SOS monitors whether the motor's motion complies with the standstill position.

- ▶ The safety function SOS corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.
- ▶ A safety-rated monitored stop in accordance with EN ISO 10218-1 can be realised with the safety function SOS.

The safety function can be used as many times as desired (limited only by the maximum number of safety functions).

#### Activation of safety function SOS

The safety function SOS can be activated in the following way:


- ▶ By external activation at the activation input ACT

#### Start of monitoring

- ▶ Once the SOS delay time has elapsed, the motor position is monitored. It may not leave the set position window.
- ▶ The position after the SOS delay time has elapsed is taken as the start position for monitoring.
- ▶ Once the SOS delay time has elapsed, the feedback output SSA becomes active (see diagram).



#### NOTICE

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details](#)  188) will not elapse until the following system cycle.



**Configuration of the safety function SOS in the configuration tool**

Field: Delay time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Delay time ( $t_{del}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 100)	[ms]	Time between activation of the safety function SOS and the point at which monitoring begins

**Monitoring**

- ▶ The actual position of the motor is continuously compared with the set standstill position window.  
If it is seen to be exceeded, an error reaction is triggered.

**Configuration of the safety function SOS in the configuration tool**

Field: Position limit value			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Standstill position window ( $pos_{win}$ )	0 ... 2147483647  (default: 100)	User-defined [default: increments]	If the limit value is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP braking ramp) is activated.

**Error reaction SOS**

- ▶ If a limit value is exceeded, safety function SS1 is activated.
- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the SSA feedback output.

**Error reaction SOS-M**

- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the feedback output SSA if a limit value is exceeded.

**Automatic SOS (optional)**

For the automatic SOS, the safety function SOS is activated before the delay time has elapsed. For this to occur, the motor speed must fall below a configurable standstill limit value.



**INFORMATION**

The standstill threshold is to be understood as a limit value because an ideal standstill (speed = 0) is frequently not achieved in real systems.

**Configuration of the safety function SOS in the configuration tool**

Field: Automatic SOS			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Automatic standstill monitoring	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activating the automatic SOS.
Limit value standstill ( $v_{lim}$ )	0 ... 16777215  (default: 340)	User-defined  [default: increments/s]	If the standstill limit value is undercut, the safety function SOS is triggered.

**Activation and feedback**

For activation and feedback of the safety function SOS, the following activation and feedback signals of the function can be routed to safe inputs and outputs:




Fig.: Function block SOS

**Legend**

- ACT      The safety function SOS is activated or deactivated via the activation input ACT.  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated).
- SSA      Safe Standstill Acknowledge  
  
The feedback output SSA reports whether the motor is within its permitted limit values (1 signal), or whether there is a limit value violation (0 signal). If the safety function is not activated, the feedback output likewise reports a 0 signal.




Fig.: Safety function SOS

**Legend**

- pos            Position
- v              Speed
- pos<sub>win</sub>       Standstill position window
- v<sub>lim</sub>          Standstill limit value
- t<sub>del</sub>          Delay time
- t<sub>1</sub>            Activation of safety function SOS
- t<sub>2</sub>            Monitoring start when automatic standstill monitoring is configured
- ACT           Input for safety function SOS
- SSA           Safe Standstill Acknowledge  
                  Output for feedback from limit value monitoring

**Hysteresis for monitoring functions**

A hysteresis can be configured optionally for the monitoring functions, see [Hysteresis for monitoring functions](#) [150].

## 5.10.9 Safe Speed Range (SSR) and Safely Monitored Speed Range (SSR-M)



### INFORMATION

The **monitoring function SSR-M "Safely Monitored Speed Range"** can be selected as a variant of the normative safety function SSR "Safe Speed Range".

The monitoring function SSR-M corresponds to the normative safety function SSR except for the error reaction.

When parameterised limit values are exceeded:

- no SS1 is triggered
- a 0 signal is issued at the SRA (Safe Range Acknowledge) output


The SSR safety function prevents the motor from exceeding the specified maximum and minimum permitted speed range.

- ▶ The safety function SSR corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.
- ▶ The safety function SSR makes it possible to realise a safety-rated reduced speed and a safety-rated monitored speed in accordance with EN ISO 10218-1.

The safety function can be used as many times as desired (limited only by the maximum number of safety functions).

### Activation of the safety function SSR

The safety function SSR can be activated in the following way:


- ▶ By external activation at the activation input ACT
- ▶ **Permanent monitoring (optional)**  78
  - The speed range is monitored without an activation signal and permanently, without an SSR delay time.
  - No external wiring is necessary.

### Start of monitoring

- ▶ Once the SSR delay time has elapsed, the speed is monitored.
- ▶ Once the SSR delay time has elapsed, the feedback output SRA becomes active (see diagram).



### NOTICE

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details](#)  188) will not elapse until the following system cycle.

**Configuration of the safety function SSR in the configuration tool**

Field: Delay time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Delay time ( $t_{del}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 20)	[ms]	Time between activation of the safety function SSR and the point at which monitoring begins

**Monitoring**

- ▶ The actual speed of the motor is continuously compared with the maximum and minimum set speed limit value.
- ▶ If one of the two limit values is seen to be exceeded, an error reaction is triggered.

**Configuration of the safety function SSR in the configuration tool**

Field: Speed limit value			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Upper limit value speed ( $v_{upperLimit}$ )	-16777216... 16777215  (default: 100000)	User-defined  [default: increments/s]	If the limit value is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP braking ramp) is activated.
Lower limit value speed ( $v_{lowerLimit}$ )	-16777216 ... 16777215  (default: -100000)	User-defined  [default: increments/s]	If the limit value is undercut, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP braking ramp) is activated.

**Error reaction SSR**

- ▶ If a limit value is exceeded, safety function SS1 is activated.
- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the SRA feedback output.

**Error reaction SSR-M**

- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the feedback output SRA if a limit value is exceeded.

### Activation and feedback

For activation and feedback of the safety function SSR, the following activation and feedback signals of the function can be routed to safe inputs and outputs:




Fig.: Function block SSR

### Legend

- ACT**      The safety function SSR is activated or deactivated via the activation input ACT.  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)
- SRA**      Safe Range Acknowledge
- The feedback output SRA reports whether the motor is within its permitted limit values (1 signal), or whether there is a limit value violation (0 signal). If the safety function is not activated, the feedback output likewise reports a 0 signal.

### Parameterising tolerance range (optional)

A tolerance range may also be set for the limit values used to monitor the speed. This tolerance range modifies the set limit values. As a result, one-off or periodic overshoots that exceed the limit values can be tolerated.

#### The following values can be parameterised for the tolerance range

- ▶ Tolerance window, which takes into account the amplitude of the overshoots.
- ▶ Tolerance time, which takes into account the width of the overshoots.
- ▶ Tolerance period, which takes into account the oscillation period.

### Activating the tolerance range

- ▶ If the speed limit value is exceeded, the tolerance range becomes active (see illustration "Safety function SSR with activated tolerance range").

### Reaction

- ▶ If the first tolerance range is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP brake ramp) is activated.

**Configuration of tolerance range in the configuration tool (optional)**

Field: Tolerance			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Tolerance range	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activates the tolerance range
Tolerance window ( $tol_{win}$ )	1 ... 25 (default: 1)	[%]	Permitted amplitude of the overshoots
Tolerance time ( $tol_{t1}$ )	1 ... 120000 (default: 100)	[ms]	Permitted width of the overshoots
Tolerance period ( $tol_{t2}$ )	2 ... 120000 (default: 1000)	[ms]	Permitted period of oscillation




Fig.: Safety function SSR without tolerance range activated

**Legend**

- v Speed
- $v_{upperLimit}$  Upper limit value speed
- $v_{lowerLimit}$  Lower limit value speed

$t_{del}$	Delay time
$t_1$	Activation of the safety function SSR
$t_2$	Monitoring start
ACT	Input for safety function SSR
SRA	Safe Range Acknowledge Output for feedback from safety function SSR




Fig.: Safety function SSR with tolerance range activated


**Legend**

$v$	Speed
$tol_{win}$	Tolerance window
$V_{upperLimit}$	Upper limit value speed
$V_{lowerLimit}$	Lower limit value speed
$t_1$	Activation of the safety function SSR
$t_2$	Start of monitoring
$t_s$	Speed $v$ exceeds limit value and activates tolerance range. (tolerance window, tolerance time, tolerance period)
$tol_{t1}$	Tolerance time [ms]
$tol_{t2}$	Tolerance period [ms]



ACT	Input for safety function SSR
SRA	Safe Range Acknowledge Output for feedback from safety function SSR

### **Hysteresis for monitoring functions**

A hysteresis can be configured optionally for the monitoring functions, see [Hysteresis for monitoring functions](#)  150].

## 5.10.10 Safely Limited Position (SLP) and Safely Monitored Position (SLP-M)



### INFORMATION

The **monitoring function SLP-M "Safely Monitored Position"** can be selected as a variant of the normative safety function SLP "Safely Limited Position".

The monitoring function SLP-M corresponds to the normative safety function SLP except for the error reaction.

When parameterised limit values are exceeded:

- no SS1 is triggered
- a 0 signal is issued at the SRA (Safe Range Acknowledge) output

The safety function SLP monitors whether the motor's motion complies with a defined lower and upper absolute position.

- ▶ The safety function SLP corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.
- ▶ Safe axial and spatial boundaries in accordance with EN ISO 10218-1 can be realised with the safety function SLP.



### INFORMATION

For the safety function SLP, an additional external absolute-value encoder must be connected to the interface X50 of the safety module.

If an external encoder is used with a different (reduced) resolution range compared to the internal motor encoder resolution, the resulting overall resolution of the system may be restricted.

Equally, a reduced overall resolution range may arise if a gear ratio exists between the drive and output ends or as a result of the mechanical transmission path itself.



### WARNING!

**Potential loss of safety function due to overflow of the signals in the motor encoder or in the external absolute-value encoder!**


Depending on the application, serious injury or death may result.

The position range of the motor encoder and external absolute-value encoder may not overflow when monitoring the absolute position.

Appropriate measures should be used to ensure that the signals are adapted to the mechanical travel.

### Activation of safety function SLP

The safety function SLP can be activated in the following way:

- ▶ By external activation at the activation input ACT
- ▶ **Permanent monitoring (optional)**  78
  - The position is monitored without an activation signal and permanently, without an SLP delay time.
  - No external wiring is necessary.



#### INFORMATION


When you use the safety function SLP with permanent monitoring (optional), make sure that the axis can be reset to the permitted range after the limit value is exceeded.

### Start of monitoring

- ▶ Once the SLP delay time has elapsed, the absolute position is monitored.
- ▶ Once the SLP delay time has elapsed, the feedback output SRA becomes active (see diagram).



#### NOTICE

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details](#)  188) will not elapse until the following system cycle.

### Configuration of the safety function SLP in the configuration tool

Field: Delay time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Delay time ( $t_{del}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 20)	[ms]	Time between activation of the safety function SLP and the point at which monitoring begins

### Monitoring

- ▶ The actual position of the motor is continuously compared with the set absolute position limit values (lower and upper).  
If it is seen to be exceeded, an error reaction is triggered.
- ▶ The absolute position of the motor encoder is verified using the position values of the external absolute encoder. The external encoder is configured with the safety module's configuration tool.
- ▶ The permitted position range is within the set limit values.

- ▶ With inverted monitoring, the permitted position range is outside the set limit values (optional).

**Configuration of the safety function SLP in the configuration tool**

Field: Position limit values			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Upper limit value position ( $v_{upperLimit}$ )	-8388608 ... 8388607 (default: 0)	User-defined  [default: increments]	If the limit value is exceeded, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP braking ramp) is activated.
Lower limit value position ( $pos_{lowerLimit}$ )	-8388608 ... 8388607 (default: 0)	User-defined  [default: increments]	If the limit value is undercut, the safety function SS1 (E-STOP braking ramp) is activated.

**Error reaction SLP**

- ▶ If a limit value is exceeded, safety function SS1 is activated.
- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the SRA feedback output.

**Error reaction SLP-M**

- ▶ A 0 signal is issued at the feedback output SRA if a limit value is exceeded.

**Activation and feedback**

For activation and feedback of the safety function SLP, the following activation and feedback signals of the function can be routed to safe inputs and outputs:




Fig.: Function block SLP

**Legend**

- ACT** The safety function SLP is activated or deactivated via the activation input ACT.  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)
- SRA** Safe Range Acknowledge  
The feedback output SRA reports whether the motor is within its permitted limit values (1 signal), or whether there is a limit value violation (0 signal). If the safety function is not activated, the feedback output likewise reports a 0 signal.

**SLP inverted (optional)**

With inverted monitoring, the permitted position range is outside the set limit values.

**Configuration of the safety function SLP inverted in the configuration tool**

Field: Position range inverted			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Position range inverted	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activated position range inverted




Fig.: Safety function SLP (not inverted)

**Legend**

- pos            Position
- pos<sub>upperLimit</sub>    Upper limit value position
- pos<sub>lowerLimit</sub>    Lower limit value position
- t<sub>del</sub>            Delay time

$t_1$	Activation of the safety function SLP
$t_2$	Monitoring start
ACT	Input for safety function SLP
SRA	Safe Range Acknowledge Output for feedback from safety function SLP





Fig.: Safety function SLP (inverted)

**Legend**

pos	Position
pos <sub>upperLimit</sub>	Upper limit value position
pos <sub>lowerLimit</sub>	Lower limit value position
t <sub>del</sub>	Delay time
t <sub>1</sub>	Activation of the safety function SLP
t <sub>2</sub>	Monitoring start
ACT	Input for safety function SLP
SRA	Safe Range Acknowledge Output for feedback from safety function SLP

### **Hysteresis for monitoring functions**

A hysteresis can be configured optionally for the monitoring functions, see [Hysteresis for monitoring functions](#)  150].

### 5.10.11 Safe Brake Control (SBC)

The safety function SBC supplies a safe output signal to control a

- ▶ closed-current mechanical brake or
- ▶ a safe device to control a brake (e.g. PWM switchgear PNOZ s50 for safe brake control).

The safety function can be used especially if additional measures to control external influences (e.g. suspended loads falling) are required in the application.

- ▶ The safety function SBC corresponds to the definition in accordance with EN 61800-5-2.
- ▶ "Holding of loads" can be realised with the safety function SBC.

See chapter [Application of the SBC and SBT safe brake functions](#)  58]

#### Activating the safety function SBC

The safety function SBC is activated as soon as the safety function STO is active. Direct activation via a safe input is not necessary.

#### Control of the assigned output

With the safety function SBC activated, a 0 signal is issued at the assigned output. A connected closed-current brake is applied, causing the mechanical braking force to be applied to the axis.

With the safety function SBC deactivated, a 1 signal is issued at the assigned output. A connected closed-current brake is released, causing the mechanical braking force to be removed from the axis

#### Connection of drive controller brake control

The safety module offers the option to assign the non-safety-related brake control signal of the drive controller SD6 to the safe brake output of an SBC function. As a result, the functional brake control of the drive controller can be combined with the safe brake control via the safety function SBC.

By activating the connection, a quiescent current-activated braking device can be used simultaneously for the following:

- ▶ Non-safety-related functions of the drive controller SD6
- ▶ Safety functions of the safety module SE6

#### Configuration of the safety function SBC in the configuration tool

Field: Connection			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Connection	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activating the connection of the drive controller's brake control signal on the safety module



**With the connection activated, the safe brake output behaves as follows**

- ▶ The safety module is in the operating state STO
  - The safety module issues a 0-signal at the brake output.
  - The brake is applied, or the braking device prompts the brake application.
  - Control by the drive controller is not possible.
- ▶ The safety module is in the operating state RUN/FSRUN
  - The brake output is controlled in a non-safety-related way by the drive controller.



**NOTICE**

In the **operating state RUN**, active safety functions must safeguard against hazardous or unpermitted movements of the drive. If the operating state STO is activated by the safety function SS1 when an error has been detected, the brake is applied safely via the safety function SBC, independently of the brake control signal from the drive controller.




Fig.: Flow chart safety function SBC with connection activated

**Legend**

- v                      Speed
- I<sub>B2</sub>                    Current, brake 2-pole
- t<sub>1</sub>                    A 0 signal is issued at the brake output SBC+/SBC- in a non-safety-related way.
- t<sub>2</sub>                    A 1 signal is issued at the brake output SBC+/SBC- in a non-safety-related way.
- t<sub>3</sub>                    The safety function STO and SBC are activated, a 0 signal is issued at the brake output SBC+/SBC- in a safety-related way.
- STO\_ACT             Input for safety function STO
- STO\_ACK             Output for feedback from safety function STO
- Drive request        Brake control signal from drive controller
- SBC+ / SBC-         Brake control output

**Use of a feedback input (optional)**

The safety function SBC offers scope for evaluating a feedback signal from the activated braking device.

The parameters for the behaviour of the feedback signal can be set in the configuration tool.

**NO – Normally open**

When the braking device is released, a 1-signal is expected as the feedback signal.

When the braking device is applied, a 0-signal is expected as the feedback signal.

**NC – Normally closed**

When the braking device is released, a 0-signal is expected as the feedback signal.

When the braking device is applied, a 1-signal is expected as the feedback signal.

The maximum delay time for feedback when changing the signal to a 1-signal (ON) and a 0-signal (OFF) can be set in the configuration tool.



**NOTICE**

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details \[188\]](#)) will not elapse until the following system cycle.

**Configuration of the safety function SBC in the configuration tool**

Field: Feedback control			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Feedback input	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activation of the feedback input
Type	1: Normally open (NO) 2: Normally closed (NC) (Default: 2)	--	Selection of feedback type
Delay time ON (Ton)	0 ... 120000 (Default: 20)	[ms]	Maximum delay time when changing signal to 1-signal
Delay time OFF (Toff)	0 ... 120000 (Default: 20)	[ms]	Maximum delay time when changing signal to 0-signal




Fig.: Safety function SBC, feedback

### Legend

Ton	Delay time ON Feedback when changing signal to 1 signal
Toff	Delay time OFF Feedback when changing signal to 0 signal
SBC_SBC	Brake control output
SBC_FBK (normally closed)	Feedback input (feedback FBK) (normally closed, N/C)
SBC_FBK (normally opened)	Feedback input (feedback FBK) (normally open, N/O)

#### 5.10.11.1 Combination options for SBC 1-pole and SBC 2-pole

There is a choice of the following function blocks in the configuration tool:

- ▶ SBC 1-pole
- ▶ SBC 2-pole



#### INFORMATION

A maximum of two SBC function blocks can be used in the configuration tool.

Possible use of the SBC function blocks:

- SBC 1-pole + SBC 1-pole
- SBC 2-pole + SBC 1-pole

The various combinations are described in the following chapter  
[Application of the SBC and SBT safe brake functions \[58\]](#)

**5.10.11.2 SBC with 1-pole output for controlling an external safe device**

The safety function SBC 1-pole is envisaged for controlling an external safe braking device. This is connected to the assigned 1-pole safe output.




Fig.: Function block SBC 1-pole

The safety function SBC 1-pole can be assigned to any 1-pole output (O0 ... Ox).

**5.10.11.3 SBC with 2-pole output for direct power control of a brake**

The safety function SBC 2-pole is envisaged for direct power control of quiescent current-actuated, mechanical brakes. The brake is connected directly to the terminals of the 2-pole output SBC+/-.




Fig.: Function block SBC 2-pole

The safety function SBC 2-pole is assigned to the 2-pole output SBC+/SBC- (see [Safety module has direct control of quiescent current-activated mechanical brakes \[60\]](#)).

### 5.10.12 Safe Brake Test (SBT)

The proper functioning of a quiescent current-actuated brake can be tested with the safety function SBT.

The safety function SBT corresponds to a cyclical test of the braking device.

The safety function can only be used once.



#### INFORMATION

When configuring the brake test, make sure that the permitted switching frequency of the connected brakes is not exceeded (see data sheet for the quiescent current-actuated, mechanical brake).

Up to four test steps can be configured in the test sequence. In each test step, a check is carried out to determine whether the brake can generate the necessary holding torque for the drive axle over a defined period. During the test, standstill of the motor is monitored from a safety-related perspective.

The following components are involved in executing the safety function SBT:

- ▶ The Drive controller SD6 with integrated safety module
- ▶ A motor connected to Drive controller (see [Permitted motor types \[18\]](#)) with motor encoder (see [Approved motor encoders \[18\]](#))
- ▶ One or more quiescent current-actuated brakes/braking devices

"Holding of loads" can be tested with the safety function SBT. The safety function "Holding of loads" can be implemented in conjunction with the safety function SBC.

For further information on application of the safety function SBT see [Application of the SBC and SBT safe brake functions \[58\]](#).



#### CAUTION!

##### Risk of injury

A hazardous status may occur if there is a faulty brake or braking device.

- Carry out the brake test in an appropriate position and ensure that nobody remains in the danger zone during the brake test.



**CAUTION!**

**Risk of injury**

**Use of two safe brakes (optional)**

After every update to the drive controller firmware, inspect the brake test for functioning. Brake 2 must be released during the safety inspection of brake 1. Brake 1 must be released during the safety inspection of brake 2.



**INFORMATION**

The safe brake test (SBT), in conjunction with safe brake control (SBC), meets the requirements of EN ISO 16090-1 for safeguarding gravity-loaded axes.

**Encoder test**

Before starting the brake test, the encoder is first tested with the brake(s) open. In this case, the motor is rotated at approx. 60 1/min maximum 45°, in both directions of rotation/movement. In this phase, the safety module's standstill monitoring is not yet active.

**Inspection period and tolerance time**

The safety function SBT must be activated cyclically, within an inspection period.

The inspection period

- ▶ should be limited to a maximum of 8 h.
- ▶ can be set in the configuration tool.
- ▶ is monitored in a safety-related way.
- ▶ is restarted once the safety function SBT has been executed without errors.

If there is no activation of the safety function SBT within the inspection period

- ▶ the tolerance time is started.
- ▶ a 0 signal is issued at the feedback output SBA.

The tolerance time

- ▶ can be set in the configuration tool.
- ▶ is monitored in a safety-related way.

If there is equally no activation of the safety function SBT within the tolerance time

- ▶ the motor is shut down with the safety function SS1.
- ▶ the safety module switches to the FAULT state.

If the RUN state is achieved after the safety mode has run up, the inspection period is treated as elapsed and the safety function SBT must be activated within the tolerance time.

**Configuration of the safety function SBT in the configuration tool**

Field: Time Settings			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Period	X ... 10000 (default: 480)	[min]	Time after which the safety function SBT must be executed. Max. 8 h
Tolerance time	1 ... 100 (default: 10)	[%]	Tolerance time of inspection period

**Activation of the safety function SBT**

The safety function SBT can be activated in the following way:

- ▶ By external activation at the activation input ACT
- ▶ By internal activation via Drive controller

**Configuration of the safety function SBT in the configuration tool**

Field: Activation			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Drive Activated	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activation of the safety function SBT is by the parameters for Drive controller .

**Start of test sequence****With external activation on the safety module's activation input**

- ▶ Once the SBT delay time has elapsed, the test sequence starts.
- ▶ Once the SBT delay time has elapsed, the feedback output SSA becomes active.
- ▶ The SBT delay time is adjustable in the configuration tool.

**With internal activation via the drive controller**

- ▶ The test sequence starts without a delay time.
- ▶ The feedback output SSA is active.

**INFORMATION**

Please note that delay times that are not a multiple of the processor system's cycle time (see [Technical details \[188\]](#)) will not elapse until the following system cycle.



**The configuration of the safety function SBT in the configuration tool**

Field: Delay time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Delay time ( $t_{del}$ )	0 ... 120000  (default: 20)	[ms]	Time between activation of the safety function SBT and the point at which monitoring begins

**Test sequence procedure**

Up to four test steps can be defined in the configuration tool for the test sequence. These are then performed in succession.

Once a test step has ended, the next test step begins after a waiting period of two seconds.

The entire test sequence is monitored via a total time  $t_{\Sigma}$  (timeout) that can be set in the configuration tool, and must be completed before this time period has elapsed. If that is not the case, safety function SS1 is activated and the safety module switches to the FAULT state. The brake test is considered to have been failed.



**INFORMATION**

**Determine the total time manually**

The total time depends on the set times for the total test sequences and must be determined manually.

**Configuration of the safety function SBT in the configuration tool**

Field: Maximum total time			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Total time ( $t_{\Sigma}$ )	0 ... 2147483647  (Default: 50)	[ms]	If the brake test is not performed within the total time, an error reaction is triggered.

During the total test sequence, standstill of the drive is monitored from a safety-related perspective. The permitted position window for standstill monitoring can be set in the configuration tool.

Field: Position window			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Standstill position window ( $pos_{win}$ )	0 ... 2147483647  (Default: 50)	User-defined  [Default: increments]	Position window of the safety function SOS (SOS is active throughout the entire brake test).

### Aborting of the test sequence

The test sequence can be aborted by the following safety functions:

- ▶ Activation of the safety function SS1
- ▶ Activation of safety function SS2
- ▶ Deactivation of the safety function SBT

After aborting

- ▶ the safety function STO is activated.
- ▶ the brake test is considered to have been failed.

### Test step

Each of the four test steps can be activated individually in the configuration tool.

In the test step,

- ▶ The torque/force-forming test current for the connected motor is recorded.
- ▶ The duration of energisation is monitored.
- ▶ The brake or braking device to be tested is activated, so that a braking force is applied.
- ▶ Motor standstill is monitored from a safety-related perspective.
- ▶ The amplitude of motor current is monitored for compliance with the tolerance window that is adjustable in the configuration tool.

### Configuration of the safety function SBT in the configuration tool

For all test steps

Field: Test steps			
Input field	Valid input/ Permanently set	Unit	Description
Waiting time ( $t_{wait}$ )	(Default: 2000) Greyed out (permanently set)	[ms]	Waiting time after each test step
Test current tolerance	1 ... 100000 (Default: 100)	[mA]	Tolerance window for test current
Execute test step	Activate/deactivate (default: deactivated)	--	Activates the test step

## For test step 1

Field: Test step 1			
Input field	Valid input/ Permanently set	Unit	Description
Test current	0 ... 100000 (Default: 0)	[mA]	<b>Positive current value</b> , which must be achieved
Duration	Greyed out (permanently set) (Default: 500)	[ms]	Duration of energisation
Brake 1	0: Brake drive controller BD1/BD2 on X5	--	Specification of brake for testing

## For test step 2

Field: Test step 2			
Input field	Valid input/ Permanently set	Unit	Description
Test current	0 ... -100000 (Default: 0)	[mA]	<b>Negative current value</b> , which must be achieved
Duration	Greyed out (permanently set) (Default: 500)	[ms]	Duration of energisation
Brake 1	0: Brake drive controller BD1/BD2 on X5	--	Specification of brake for testing

**For test step 3**

Field: Test step 3			
Input field	Valid input/ Permanently set	Unit	Description
Test current	0 ... 100000 (Default: 0)	[mA]	<b>Positive current value</b> , which must be achieved
Duration	Greyed out (permanently set) (Default: 500)	[ms]	Duration of energisation
SBC function Brake 2	SBC-NameX*	--	Specification of brake for testing
	SBC-NameY*	--	Specification of brake for testing
*SBC-NameX, SBC-NameY The designations/names of the brakes are specified in the configuration tool of the safety function SBC.			

**For test step 4**

Field: Test step 4			
Input field	Valid input/ Permanently config- urable	Unit	Description
Test current	0 ... -100000 (Default: 0)	[mA]	<b>Negative current value</b> , which must be achieved
Duration	Greyed out (permanently set) (Default: 500)	[ms]	Duration of energisation
SBC function Brake 2	SBC-NameX*	--	Specification of brake for testing
	SBC-NameY*	--	Specification of brake for testing
*SBC-NameX, SBC-NameY The designations/names of the brakes are specified in the configuration tool of the safety function SBC.			

The brake/braking device of the completed test step is released as soon as the brake force of the brake/braking device for the next test step is applied. This overlap prevents a suspended load from dropping.

Throughout the entire test step, the motor may only move within the configured tolerance window.

If the safety module detects an error via one of the monitoring functions

- ▶ the safety function SS1 is activated.
- ▶ the safety module switches to the FAULT state.

#### **Calculation of test current**

The test current corresponds to the force-forming component of the motor current.

For rotary motors, the test torque is calculated using the following formula:

- Test current x torque constant

For linear motors, the test force is calculated using the following formula:

- Test current x force constant

Forces or torques already acting on the axis must be considered in the measurement, e.g. suspended loads.

#### **Test sequence completed successfully**

If all test steps have been performed without errors, the test sequence has been completed successfully.

Then

- ▶ the test period is started afresh.
- ▶ a 1 signal is issued at the feedback output SBA.

Configurations that may have been designed incorrectly can be detected through the diagnostics (document "Safety module SE6 – Diagnostics") and appropriate solution approaches found.

### Activation and feedback

For activation and feedback of the safety function SBT, the following activation and feedback signals from the function can be routed to safe inputs and outputs.




Fig.: Function blocks SBT

### Legend

- ACT      The safety function SBT is activated or deactivated via the activation input ACT (1 signal activated, 0 signal deactivated).
- SBA      Safe Brake Acknowledge  
             The feedback output reports that the last brake test was completed successfully and the test period has not yet elapsed (1 signal) or that the brake test is in progress (0 signal) or that the test period has elapsed (0 signal).
- SSA      Safe Standstill Acknowledge  
             The feedback output reports that standstill monitoring is active and the motor is at a standstill (1 signal) or that the motor has moved during the brake test in progress (0 signal).
- optional    As an option, the safety function SBT can be activated via the Drive controller (selectable in the configuration tool).



#### INFORMATION

The safety function SBT is activated with a positive edge.  
 The safety function SBT is the only safety function that has direct influence on the drive axle by applying power to the motor. All other safety functions monitor the drive axle controlled by the Drive controller.




Fig.: Safety function SBT

### Legend

pos	Position
$t_{\Sigma}$	Total time
$t_{wait}$	Waiting period (permanently set, 2 seconds, applies to all test steps)
$I_1$	Test current test step 1
$I_2$	Test current test step 2
$I_3$	Test current test step 3
$I_4$	Test current test step 4
$t_{del}$	Delay time
$t_1$	Brake test duration test step 1
$t_2$	Brake test duration test step 2
$t_3$	Brake test duration test step 3
$t_4$	Brake test duration test step 4
ACT	Input for safety function SBT
SBA	Safe Brake Acknowledge Output for feedback from safety function SBT
SSA	Safe Standstill Acknowledge Output for feedback from standstill monitoring

### 5.10.13 Safe Restart Lock (SRL)

The safety function SRL prevents the safety module from leaving the operating status STO by a reset. An unexpected or unintended motor start-up is thus not possible.

- ▶ The safety function SRL can be used to prevent an unexpected start-up in accordance with ISO 14118.

The safety function can only be used once.

#### Activation of the safety function SRL

The safety function SRL can be activated in the following way:

- ▶ By external activation at the activation input ACT

The following activation signals for the function can be connected to a safe input for activation of the safety function SRL:




Fig.: Function block SRL

#### Legend

ACT The safety function SRL is activated or deactivated via the activation input ACT.  
(0 signal activated, 1 signal deactivated)

#### 0 signal (activated)

The RESET is blocked and cannot be triggered.

Supplementary information on the RESET behaviour is provided in the following sections:

[Safe restart of the machine](#)  51]

[Resetting \(RESET\) the safety module](#)  52]

#### Switching from 0-signal to 1-signal

Various actions can be configured in the configuration tool.

The following can be performed when switching from 0-signal to 1-signal:

- ▶ RESTART of safety module is triggered, errors are acknowledged or
- ▶ Only errors are acknowledged or
- ▶ No operation takes place.



**1-signal (deactivated)**

A RESET is possible (as an option, depending on other RESET settings).

**Configuration of the safety function SRL in the configuration tool**

Field: RESET trigger			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
RESET behaviour	0: NOP (Default: 0)	--	No operation No RESTART occurs.
	1: ACK ERR	--	Acknowledge error No RESTART occurs.
	2: RESTART	--	Acknowledge error A RESTART is triggered.



**INFORMATION**

A RESET of the safety module (switching to the operating status RUN) can only take place if the activation input SS1\_ACT (and STO\_ACT, if configured) has a 1 signal.




Fig.: Safety function SRL, RESET

### Legend

- State RUN      The device status of the safety module is RUN.  
(see [Operating states](#) [ 177])
- State STO      The device status of the safety module is STO  
(see [Operating states](#) [ 177])
- ACT            Input for safety function SRL
- ACK            The ACK command was performed via the drive controller.
- SS1\_ACT       Input for safety function SS1
- Optionally  
STO\_ACT       Optional input for safety function STO

### 5.10.14 Safe Status Output (SSO)

The safety function "Safe Status Output" (SSO) reports the current status of the safety module. The three outputs READY, FSRUN and  $\overline{\text{FAULT}}$  (no error) are available.

The safety function can only be used once.



The safety function SSO does not require explicit activation.

#### Output READY

##### 1 signal


- ▶ The safety module is operational.

##### 0 signal


- ▶ In the following cases the safety module is not operational:
  - No supply voltage
  - Safety module is in RUNUP, see [Operating states](#) [ 177]
  - Safety module is in STARTUP, see [Operating states](#) [ 177]
  - Fatal error

#### Output FSRUN

##### 1-signal

- ▶ A motion-monitoring safety function is active (in other words excluding SSO, SBC, SRL or the safety function SS1 if brake ramp monitoring is not configured).
- ▶ Standstill monitoring during the brake test SBT is active.
- ▶ The safety module is in the operating state FSRUN (see [Operating states](#) [ 177])

##### 0-signal

- ▶ No motion-monitoring safety function is active (in other words, SSO, SBC, SRL or the safety functions SS1 without configured brake ramp monitoring may be active).
- ▶ Standstill monitoring during the brake test SBT is not active.
- ▶ The safety module is not in the operating state FSRUN (see [Operating states](#) [ 177])

#### Output $\overline{\text{FAULT}}$ (no error)

##### 1 signal

- ▶ The safety module has no error.

##### 0 signal

- ▶ The safety module has an error.

**Feedback**

The following feedback signals of the function can be connected to safe outputs for feedback of the safety function SSO:




Fig.: Function block SSO

**Legend**

**READY** The READY output reports whether the safety module is operational.

**FSRUN** The FSRUN output reports whether a safety function is active.  
(The safety functions SSO, SBC or SRL are excluded)

**FAULT** (no error) The  $\overline{\text{FAULT}}$  output reports whether the safety module has an error.




Fig.: Safety function SSO

**Legend**

Status Status of safety module

Safety Function Safety functions

READY Output for feedback on whether the safety module is operational.

FSRUN (SS1 brake ramp monitoring inactive)	Output for feedback on whether a safety function is active. (The safety functions SSO, SBC or SRL are excluded, the safety function SS1 with non-activated brake ramp monitoring)
FSRUN (SS1 Brake Ramp Monitoring active)	Output for feedback on whether a safety function is active. (The safety functions SSO, SBC or SRL are excluded, the safety function SS1 with activated brake ramp monitoring)
<u>FAULT</u>	Output for feedback on whether the safety module has an error.
Safety Function Limit Violation	Limit value exceeded by a motion-monitoring safety function

### 5.10.15 Hysteresis for monitoring functions

A **hysteresis window** may also be defined for the limit values for monitoring.

This makes it possible to avoid toggling the feedback signal in the limit value range.

A hysteresis window can be defined for the following monitoring functions

- ▶ SDI-M (Safely Monitored Direction)
- ▶ SLI-M (Safely Monitored Increment)
- ▶ SLS-M (Safely Monitored Speed)
- ▶ SOS-M (Safely Monitored Operating Stop)
- ▶ SSR-M (Safely Monitored Speed Range)
- ▶ SLP-M (Safely Monitored Position)



#### INFORMATION

##### Hysteresis (optional)

If the permanent monitoring option function [Permanent monitoring \(optional\)](#) [📖 78]) has been selected in the configurator for a monitoring function, it is mandatory to select the hysteresis option.

The Set/Reset function (default) is then not possible.

#### Behaviour upon exceeding limit value

If it is identified that a limit value has been exceeded, the output for the safety function in question is reset (0 signal).

Renewed setting of the feedback output (1 signal) must be performed via one of the two functions:

- ▶ SET/RESET function (default)
- ▶ Hysteresis (optional)

##### SET/RESET function (default)

- ▶ The output remains permanently reset (0 signal) even if exceeding of the limit value no longer applies.
- ▶ The output remains reset (0 signal) until the safety function is activated again at the input after an activation edge, the delay time has elapsed and limit value violation no longer applies.

##### Hysteresis (optional)

- ▶ After exceeding of a limit value the feedback output is only reset when the actual value has fallen below the limit value by the configured hysteresis value.

**Configuration of a monitoring function with hysteresis in the configuration tool**

Field: Hysteresis			
Input field	Valid entry	Unit	Description
Hysteresis	Activate/deactivate  (default: deactivated)		Activated: Renewed setting of the feedback output via hysteresis.  Deactivated: the SET/RESET function is active.
Hysteresis window (hyst <sub>win</sub> )	0 ... 100  (default: 10)	[%]	Defines an additional window for the defined limit value. If the actual value has fallen below the limit value by the hysteresis window, the feedback output is set again.

**Behaviour of hysteresis, depending on monitoring function**

Safety function	Valid entry	Description
SDI-M	-	The tolerance window configured in the input field "Window standstill position (pos <sub>win</sub> )" is used as the hysteresis window. So if the current position moves in the correct direction by more than the configured tolerance window after a limit value has been exceeded, the feedback output is set again.
SLI-M	0 ... 100 %	0 ... 100 % of the permitted position range, in other words the sum of the input value "Upper limit value position (pos <sub>upperLimit</sub> )" and "Lower limit value position (pos <sub>lowerLimit</sub> )", is used as the hysteresis window.
SLS-M	0 ... 100 %	0 ... 100 % of the limit value configured in the input field "Limit value speed (v <sub>lim</sub> )" is used as the hysteresis window.
SOS-M	0 ... 100 %	0 ... 100 % of the limit value configured in the input field "Position window standstill (pos <sub>win</sub> )" is used as the hysteresis window.
SSR-M	0 ... 100 %	0 ... 100 % of the permitted speed range, in other words the difference between the input value "Upper limit value position (v <sub>upperLimit</sub> )" and "Lower limit value position (v <sub>lowerLimit</sub> )", is used as the hysteresis window.
SLP-M	0 ... 100 %	0 ... 100% of the permitted position range, in other words the difference between the input value "Upper limit value position (pos <sub>upperLimit</sub> )" and "Lower limit value position (pos <sub>lowerLimit</sub> )", is used as the hysteresis window.

The monitoring function SLS-M (Safely Monitored Speed) serves as an example of the behaviour upon hysteresis and SET/RESET.




Fig.: Flow chart SLS-M, hysteresis (optional)

**Legend**

v	Speed
$hyst_{win}$	Hysteresis window
$v_{lim}$	Speed limit value
$t_1$	Activation of the safety function SLS-M
$t_2$	Monitoring start
$t_{del}$	Delay time
ACT	Activation input for safety function SLS-M
SRA	Safe Range Acknowledge Output for feedback from the safety function SLS-M






Fig.: Flow chart SLS-M, SET/RESET (default)

**Legend**

v	Speed
v <sub>lim</sub>	Speed limit value
t <sub>del</sub>	Delay time
ACT	Activation input for safety function SLS-M
SRA	Safe Range Acknowledge Output for feedback from the safety function SLS-M

## 5.11 Configuration



### INFORMATION

The safety module is delivered without a configuration. Before operation is possible, a configuration must be created and the safety configuration must be transferred to the safety module.

The safety functions to be performed by the safety module are defined in the safety configurator (PASmotion) (PASmotion is part of the DriveControlSuite):

- ▶ Configuration of the safety functions required for safe motion sequences.
- ▶ Setting parameters for
  - Limit values
  - Braking ramps for the safety functions
  - Monitoring motion sequences
- ▶ The inputs and outputs are mapped to the safety functions.

There are various ways of transferring the configuration.

#### **Transfer of the configuration to the safety module (Download)**

- ▶ Online from the configurator to the safety module
- ▶ Transfer of the configuration from the drive controller's Paramodule to the safety module.
- ▶ The plausibility of the configuration is checked when it is downloaded.

#### **Transfer of the configuration from the safety module (Upload)**

- ▶ Online from the safety module to the configurator
- ▶ Saving the configuration on the drive controller's Paramodule.

#### **In online mode it is possible to**

- ▶ Display operating states of the safety module (in parameter navigation: error stack)
- ▶ Display messages (in parameter navigation: error stack)
- ▶ Download configuration to the safety module
- ▶ Upload configuration to the PC

**The following security mechanisms are integrated**

- ▶ Safe addressing of the safety module (identification of the safety module from the serial number)
- ▶ Access to projects is password protected
- ▶ The configuration during download and upload is password protected
- ▶ Project has unique check sum

A PDF file can be created to **document** the project and all its settings (Report).



**INFORMATION**

Further information on the configuration and parameter settings for the safety functions is available in the safety module Configurator's online help.

## 6 Wiring

### 6.1 General wiring guidelines

#### Hardware inputs

Note the wiring considerations described in the following chapter.


[Activation of the safety functions via hardware inputs](#)  28]

#### Hardware outputs

Note the wiring considerations described in the following chapter.

[Feedback of the safety functions via hardware inputs](#)  30]

#### Cable material

- ▶ Use copper wiring.
- ▶ Max. cable lengths
  - Supply voltage: Max. 30 m
  - Hardware inputs and outputs: Max. 30 m
  - 1-pole hardware output 1BD1/1BD2 (X5) max. 100 m
  - 2-pole hardware output SBC+/SBC- (X8) max. 100 m
  - External encoder 30 ... 50 m, see [External encoder](#)  163]

#### Conductor cross-sections



#### INFORMATION

Specification of the crimp connectors (AEH) takes place in accordance with DIN 46228-1 or DIN 46228-4.

Terminal specification X2, X5, X7, X8		
Grid dimensions	5.08 mm	
Rated current at 40°C ambient temperature	CE / UL / CSA	16 A/ 10 A/ 10 A
Max. conductor cross section	Flexible without AEH	2.5 mm <sup>2</sup>
	Flexible with AEH without plastic collar	2.5 mm <sup>2</sup>
	Flexible with AEH with plastic collar	2.5 mm <sup>2</sup>
	2 flexible conductors with double AEH with plastic collar	--
	AWG in accordance with UL/ CSA	12



<b>Terminal specification X2, X5, X7, X8</b>		
<b>Grid dimensions</b>	<b>5.08 mm</b>	
Min. conductor cross section	Flexible without AEH	0.2 mm <sup>2</sup>
	Flexible with AEH without plastic collar	0.2 mm <sup>2</sup>
	Flexible with AEH with plastic collar	0.2 mm <sup>2</sup>
	2 flexible conductors with double AEH with plastic collar	--
	AWG in accordance with UL/CSA	26
Stripping length	10 mm	


<b>Terminal specification X14 / X15</b>		
<b>Grid dimensions</b>	<b>3.5 mm</b>	
Rated current at 40°C ambient temperature	CE / UL / CSA	8 A
Max. conductor cross section	Flexible without AEH	1.5 mm <sup>2</sup>
	Flexible with AEH without plastic collar	1.5 mm <sup>2</sup>
	Flexible with AEH with plastic collar	0.75 mm <sup>2</sup>
	2 flexible conductors with double AEH with plastic collar	--
	AWG in accordance with UL/CSA	16
Min. conductor cross section	Flexible without AEH	0.2 mm <sup>2</sup>
	Flexible with AEH without plastic collar	0.25 mm <sup>2</sup>
	Flexible with AEH with plastic collar	0.25 mm <sup>2</sup>
	2 flexible conductors with double AEH with plastic collar	--
	AWG in accordance with UL/CSA	24
Stripping length	10 mm	

Please note:


- ▶ To prevent EMC interferences (particularly common-mode interferences) the measures described in EN 60204-1 must be executed. This includes the separate routing of cables of the control circuits (input, start and feedback loop) from other cables for energy transmission or the shielding of cables, for example.


## 6.2 Connector pin assignment


X14	Pin	Name	Description
	1	I0	Safe digital input
	2	I1	Safe digital input
	3	I2	Safe digital input
	4	I3	Safe digital input
	5	GND	Reference potential for digital inputs (0 V)
	6	I4	Safe digital input
	7	I5	Safe digital input
	8	I6	Safe digital input
	9	I7	Safe digital input
	10	GND	Reference potential for digital inputs (0 V)
X15	Pin	Name	Description
	1	+24V_Volts	Supply voltage for digital outputs (24 V <sub>DC</sub> ) (PELV)  Note: The supply voltage is also required if no safe outputs are used.
	2	O0	Safe binary output
	3	O1	Safe binary output
	4	Venc	Supply voltage for external encoder
	5	O2	Safe binary output
	6	O3	Safe binary output
	7	O4	Safe binary output
	8	GNDenc	Reference potential for external encoder (0 V)

X8	Pin	Name	Description
	3	SBC+	Output Activation of brake 2 +
	4	SBC-	Output Activation of brake 2 -


The following plug assignments/functions are described in the operating manual for the drive controller:

X2	Pin	Name	Description
	7	1TP1/1K1+	Motor temperature sensor
	8	1TP2/1K2-	Motor temperature sensor


X7	Pin	Name	Description
	1	+24 V	Brake supply (PELV)
	2	GND	Brake supply

X5	Pin	Name	Description
	5	1BD1	Output Activation of brake 1 +
	6	1BD2	Output Activation of brake 1 -

### 6.3 Hardware inputs

X14	Pin	Designation	Description
	1	I0	Safe input
	2	I1	Safe input
	3	I2	Safe input
	4	I3	Safe input
	6	I4	Safe input
	7	I5	Safe input
	8	I6	Safe input
	9	I7	Safe input

Terminal configuration



Connection principle

## 6.4 Hardware outputs

### 6.4.1 Supply voltage

The hardware outputs need a 24 VDC supply.

- ▶ When selecting the power supply, take note of the requirements in chapter [Technical details \[187\]](#).




**WARNING!**  
**Risk of electrocution!**

Safe electrical isolation must be ensured for the external power supply that generates the supply voltage.


X15	Pin	Designation	Description
	1	+24 V_Vouts	Supply voltage for hardware outputs (24 V <sub>DC</sub> ) (PELV)

Terminal configuration




X14	Pin	Designation	Description
	5	GND	Reference potential for hardware outputs (GND) GND is internally linked to GND
	10	GND	


Terminal configuration

Supply voltage		
		Max. cable length: 30 m  24 V connection isolated from external power supply, e.g. with isolating transformer  Fuse 4 A T


Connection

X7	Pin	Designation	Description
	1	+ 24 V	Brake supply (PELV)
	2	GND	Brake supply


Terminal configuration

Supply voltage		
		Max. cable length: 30 m Brake's supply voltage: 24 V <sub>DC</sub> (PELV) Tolerance: 0 ... 20% Fuse 8 A T

### 6.4.2 Single-pole hardware outputs


X15	Pin	Designation	Description
	2	O0	Safe binary output
	3	O1	Safe binary output
	5	O2	Safe binary output
	6	O3	Safe binary output
	7	O4	Safe binary output

Terminal configuration




Connection principle

### 6.4.3 Dual-pole hardware outputs

X8	Pin	Name	Description
	3	SBC+	Output: Activation of brake 2 +
	4	SBC-	Output: Activation of brake 2 -

Connector pin assignment



Connection

## 6.5 External encoder

### 6.5.1 Supply voltage




**WARNING!**  
**Risk of electrocution!**

Safe electrical isolation must be ensured for the external power supply that generates the supply voltage.

X15	Pin	Designation	Description
	4	Venc	Supply voltage for external encoder (PELV)
	8	GNDenc	Reference potential for external encoder (0 V)


Terminal configuration




Connection

### 6.5.2 Incremental encoder with TTL signal

If the cable length is > 50 m, please speak to our Customer Support.

X50	Pin	Designation	Description
	1	V+	Supply voltage
	2	0 V	Supply voltage reference potential
	3	n. c.	--
	4	A	Channel A
	5	/A	Channel A inverted
	6	n. c.	--
	7	B	Channel B
	8	/B	Channel B inverted
n. c.: Not connected			


Connector pin assignment




Connection

### 6.5.3 Absolute encoder with SSI interface

If the cable length is > 50 m, please speak to our Customer Support.

X50	Pin	Designation	Description
	1	V+	Supply voltage
	2	0 V	Supply voltage reference potential
	3	n. c.	---
	4	CLOCK	Pulse signal
	5	/CLOCK	Pulse signal inverted
	6	n. c.	---
	7	DATA	Data
	8	/DATA	Data inverted
n. c.: Not connected			

Connector pin assignment



Connection

## 7 Commissioning

### 7.1 Safety guidelines

When commissioning/recommissioning, please note the following:

- ▶ Secure the site in accordance with the regulations (barrier, warning signs etc.). The system may only be commissioned/recommissioned by qualified personnel.
- ▶ Please refer to the information and specifications stated in the operating manual of the relevant programmable control system.
- ▶ During commissioning/recommissioning, make sure that no personal injury and/or material damage can occur, even if the plant/machine moves unintentionally.
- ▶ When commissioning the safety module, please read the safety guidelines for the Drive controller.



#### **DANGER!**

Risk of electrocution!

Never wire the electrical connections for the Drive controller while the system is live.

Switch off the mains voltages and 24 V supply!

Make sure that the control cabinet is made safe, e.g. through an access lock or warning signs. Do not switch on the voltages until the system is commissioned!



#### **WARNING!**

##### **Risk to life from the automatic start-up of the motor!**

The motor can start moving immediately after configuration of the safety module if the Autostart option (parameter A34) has been set in the drive configuration:

- ▶ Appropriate measures should be taken so that the start of the machine does not create a hazardous situation.
  - after the safety module has booted
  - when recommissioning after a fault



#### **INFORMATION**

The Safe Restart Lock (SRL) safety function can be used to prevent unexpected automatic start-up of the motor.

## 7.2 Initial commissioning

### Requirements for commissioning

- ▶ The drive controller is ready for commissioning (see operating manual for the drive controller).
- ▶ The safety module must be included in the commissioning software for the drive controller.
- ▶ The serial number of the safety module is known. It can be read as follows via parameter S54 of the drive controller:
  - Activating the parameter list in the commissioning software DriveControlSuite.
  - Via the display of the SD6 drive controller



#### INFORMATION

During commissioning, the serial number must be confirmed in the safety configuration.

### 1. Wire the safety module



#### INFORMATION

Please note the guidelines given under "Wiring".

- ▶ Connect the reference potential for the inputs (X14/5) and the supply voltage for the outputs (X15/1).



#### INFORMATION

Do not switch on the supply voltage at this point.

Wire the inputs and outputs that are to be configured.


- ▶ Note that the SS1\_ACT input for the SS1 safety function must always be connected. (Connection of the STO\_ACT input is optional).

## 2. Connect the configuration PC to the drive controller

- ▶ Connect the PC to the drive controller.

## 3. Switch on the supply voltage

- ▶ Switch on all the supply voltages for the drive controller and the safety module.
  - ⇒ The display shows: STÖBER ANTRIEBSTECHNIK SD6A
  - ⇒ The display shows: Status display self-test

You will see the ready state of the drive controller and the safety module on the display of the drive controller. A description of the status output of the safety module is provided in the following chapter [Safety module operation](#) [ 176].

- ⇒ The system starts up and boots (RUNUP).

Further information is provided in Chapter [Operating states](#) [ 177].


The safety module switches to the STO\_FAULT state.



### INFORMATION

The safety module is provided by the factory without a safety configuration, thus the system stops booting when it has reached the fault state (STO\_FAULT) during commissioning.

The display shows:



## 4. Start DriveControlSuite and configure the safety module

- ▶ Start the commissioning software DriveControlSuite.
- ▶ Plan and configure your drive system.  
(More detailed information may be found in the commissioning instructions for the SD6 drive controller.)




## 5. Configure the safety module via PASmotion



### INFORMATION

You will find additional useful recommendations and function descriptions for the safety functions in the online help of the configurator.

- ▶ In the project tree, mark the drive controller with the SE6 safety module to be configured.
- ▶ Click on "  Safety Configuration"
  - ⇒ → The configuration tool PASmotion opens.
- ▶ The following basic settings for offline operation are mandatory:
  - Define passwords
  - Defining units (optional)  
(The units are independent of the drive controller's axis model.)
  - External encoder (optional)
  - Configure motor
  - Configure the safety function SS1 Safe stop 1
  - Assign inputs and outputs
- ▶ Additional configuration is optional.

## 6. Download the safety configuration

Prerequisites for downloading the safety configuration

- ▶ The corresponding safety configuration was selected in PASmotion.
- ▶ The safety configuration has been created and saved in offline mode.
- ▶ You have read the serial number for the safety module contained in parameter S54 via the SD6 display or the parameter list of the DriveControlSuite.
- ▶ Switch on the SD6 drive controller and establish an online connection to it.
  - ⇒ Once the connection to the drive controller has been established, the safety configurations are compared. As there is no configuration as yet during commissioning, PASmotion defines various safety configurations.
- ▶ Select **Next**.
- ▶ Confirm the correct serial number for the safety module.
- ▶ Select **Next**.
- ▶ Select **Download**.
  - ⇒ The "Download successfully completed" window (green circle with tick) opens.
- ▶ Select **Done**.


Further information on the download can be found in the safety module's online help.

### 7. Save the configuration to the safe drive controller

- ▶ Press the diskette symbol on the drive controller or save the configuration in the DriveControlSuite using the "Save values" assistant.
  - ⇒ The configuration is saved to the paramodule of the drive controller.

You have successfully transferred the configuration from the safety module to the drive controller and saved it.

### 8. Safety tests

Please note the following chapter [Safety checks](#) [ 174].

## 7.3 Restarting after device replacement

The SD6A drive controller with safety module has been replaced with a new device.

The configuration stored on the Paramodule is to be installed on the new device.

Follow the instructions below:


#### Insert the Paramodule into the new drive controller

- ▶ Remove the Paramodule supplied with the drive controller.
- ▶ Insert the Paramodule with the saved configuration into the drive controller.

#### 2: Switch on supply voltage

- ▶ Switch on the supply voltage to the drive controller.
  - ⇒ The display shows: STÖBER ANTRIEBSTECHNIK SD6A
  - ⇒ The display shows: Status display self-test

The display shows:



#### 3. Save configuration on the safety module

- ▶ Press the right and left arrow keys simultaneously for two seconds.




**NOTICE**

Deliberate action!


By operating the operator key for at least 2 seconds you confirm the correct mapping of the safety configuration to the safety module.

If you do not press the arrow keys within 60 seconds, the data transfer process will be aborted (see point 5.).

The display shows:




The display shows:



#### 4. Completing device exchange

- ▶ Acknowledge the message

The display shows:



- ▶ The drive controller is ready to be switched on.



#### INFORMATION

The drive controller only switches to "Ready to switch on", for example, when the following basic requirements are met:

- The safety function STO is inactive
- The intermediate circuit of the drive controller has been charged
- The device enable is inactive


Parameter E49 of the drive controller indicates why the drive controller is not ready to switch on.

### 5. Transfer of the configuration from the Paramodule was aborted

The right and left arrow keys (see Items 2. and 3.) were not pressed for two seconds within a period of 60 seconds.

⇒ Termination of data transfer

The display shows:



### 6. Safety checks

Please refer to the section below [Safety checks](#)  174].

## 7.4 Safety checks

The safety module SE6 is a safety component under the Machinery Directive in accordance with Annex V. It guarantees functional safety against hardware and firmware errors, for example. However, it does not guarantee the safety of the overall process, nor of the configuration.

The machine manufacturer must check and verify the functionality of the employed safety functions.

- ▶ The safety function may only be checked by qualified personnel.

### The safety function must be checked

- ▶ After initial commissioning
- ▶ After changing the configuration of the safety functions
- ▶ After exchanging the safety module or the Drive controller
- ▶ After changing the configuration of the Drive controller (e.g. when changing the motor type, motor encoder type or brake selection)

### A full check comprises

- ▶ Proper execution of the employed safety functions of the safety module SE6
- ▶ Proper execution of the overall safety function (e.g. combination and integration of safety functions)
- ▶ Inspection of the parameters
- ▶ Examination of the overruns and safety distances of the plant/machine



### NOTICE

When commissioning the plant/machine, loss of the motor encoder signal and the motor acceleration that may result should be simulated. This demonstrates that the calculated overrun and the resulting minimum distance of the plant/machine are adequate.

### Basis for testing

- ▶ The requirements of the safety functions on the safety module SE6, resulting from the risk analysis of the machine or process
- ▶ The description of the safety module SE6 and its safety functions in accordance with this operating manual
- ▶ All safety-related parameters and values of the employed safety functions

### The result of the test must be documented in a test report. This report must contain the following:

- ▶ A description of the application, including a diagram
- ▶ A description of the safety-related components (including software versions) used by the application
- ▶ A list of the employed safety functions
- ▶ The results of all tests related to these safety functions

- ▶ A list of all safety-related parameters and their values
- ▶ Check sums, test dates and confirmation by the test staff

Safety tests conducted on equivalent applications may be carried out as an individual type test of the equivalent application, provided that it can be ensured that the safety functions are configured as intended for all devices.



### INFORMATION


If any of the parameters for the safety functions have been changed, the check must be repeated and this must be recorded in the test report.

### Brake test

Depending on the application, the regular checks may include a test of the internal (motor brake) and external brake(s).



### INFORMATION

Refer to [Safe Brake Test \(SBT\)](#) [ 134] for the function of the safe brake test.

## 8 Safety module operation

The conditions for the RUN operating status are:

- ▶ Commissioning is complete
- ▶ The safety module contains the configuration data
- ▶ The safety functions have been tested
- ▶ The drive controller display indicates:  
Status display 6: Ready for switching on (parameter E80)

During operation

- ▶ the signal level and edge change are monitored at the safe inputs of the safety module.
- ▶ the safety functions are performed in accordance with the configuration.
- ▶ the switchability of the hardware outputs is monitored.
- ▶ permanent hardware self-tests are carried out.



## 8.1 Operating states

The safety module is always in a clearly defined operating status.






Fig.: Operating statuses

CONFIG	<p>Transfer of the configuration to the safety module.</p> <p>The motor is switched to torque/force-free in the CONFIG operating status (STO is active).</p> <p>Transition to STARTUP state: configuration downloaded without error</p> <p>Transition to STO state: incorrect configuration data</p>
POWER ON	<p>The supply voltage is present.</p> <p>Transition to STO state: after applying supply voltage</p>
SS1	<p>SS1 is performed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ As error reaction function (FAULT)</li> <li>▶ By the activation input SS1_ACT (STOP)</li> <li>▶ By internal request                         <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– e.g. demand from "Download configuration" tool</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Transition to STO state:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ After FATAL</li> <li>▶ When exceeding brake ramp (optional)</li> <li>▶ After STO delay time has elapsed</li> </ul>
STARTUP	<p>Self-test of safety module is performed.</p> <p>Transition to STO state: after FAULT</p> <p>Transition to RUN state: No fault present</p>

<p>STO</p>	<p>The motor is switched to torque-free/force-free. Depending on the cause, the following (sub-)statuses are active:</p> <p><b>STOP</b> – Stop Switching motor to torque-free/force-free by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Activation input SS1_ACT or</li> <li>▶ Activation input STO_ACT (optional)</li> </ul> <p><b>FAULT</b> – Error Switching motor to torque-free/force-free via the safety function SS1, as a result of an error reaction:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Limit value violation</li> <li>▶ Internal error from self-test</li> </ul> <p><b>FATAL</b> – Fatal error Switching motor to torque-free/force-free via the safety function STO, as a result of an error reaction:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Safety-critical error that requires shutdown of the entire module</li> <li>▶ Unrecoverable internal software error</li> <li>▶ Errors that are neither revealed by a self-test nor constitute a limit value violation</li> </ul>
<p>RUN</p>	<p>Safety module in operation: no motion-monitoring safety function is activated</p> <p>Transition to STO state: After FATAL</p> <p>Transition to FSRUN state: a motion-monitoring safety function is activated</p>
<p>FSRUN</p>	<p>Safe operation: at least one motion-monitoring safety function is activated</p> <p>Transition to STO state: After FATAL</p> <p>Transition to SS1 state: After STOP or after FAULT</p> <p>Transition to RUN state: motion-monitoring safety function is deactivated</p>
<p>RESET</p>	<p>Action that triggers the RESTART (see <a href="#">Safe restart of the machine</a>  51) (see <a href="#">Resetting (RESET) the safety module</a>  52)</p>
<p>RUNUP</p>	<p>Run-up</p>
<p>RESTART</p>	<p>Restart</p>



**INFORMATION**

**Motion-monitoring safety function**

Motion-monitoring safety functions are all safety functions with the exception of SSO, SBC SRL and SS1, if brake ramp monitoring is not configured.

## 8.2 RUNUP (booting)

The safety module passes through the following states during the runup:

POWER ON → STO → STARTUP → RUN

Once switched on (POWER ON), the system enters the STO safe state. The booting process continues automatically to the STARTUP state. During the STARTUP, the safety module carries out a self-test. Once this has been completed, the system automatically enters the RUN state.

During the runup, the system passes through the aforementioned states without user action.

## 8.3 RESTART

The safety module passes through the following states during the restart:


STO → STARTUP → RUN




### INFORMATION


**The SE6 safety module provides various optional configuration options for a restart.**

The RESTART function can be optionally configured via the safety functions Safe Restart Lock (SRL) and Safe Stop 1.

(See [Safe Restart Lock \(SRL\)](#) [ 144])

Further information about a RESET may be found in Chapters

[Safe restart of the machine](#) [ 51]

[Resetting \(RESET\) the safety module](#) [ 52].

## 8.4 Display elements

The status display of the safety module is shown on the drive controller display.

Display	Description
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; text-align: center;"> <p>STÖBER DRIVE TECHNOLOGY SD6A</p> <p>[Current device firmware]</p> </div>	<p>Display after POWER ON</p>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">Status indicator</p> <hr style="width: 50%; margin: 10px auto;"/> <p style="text-align: center;">Self test</p> </div>	<p>Display after POWER ON</p> <p>The safety module carries out a self-test.</p>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">Status indicator</p> <hr style="width: 50%; margin: 10px auto;"/> <p style="text-align: right;">0.0839 Incr. 10.43002 incr./s 0.0 A</p> <p>6: Ready to switch on</p> </div>	<p>The drive controller is ready to be switched on.</p> <p>The safety module is in the RUN state.</p>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">...Safety active...</p> <hr style="width: 50%; margin: 10px auto;"/> <p style="text-align: right;">0.0839 Incr. 10.43002 incr./s 0.0 A</p> <p>6: Ready to switch on</p> </div>	<p>The drive controller is ready to be switched on.</p> <p>The safety module is in the FSRUN state.</p>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">Error</p> <hr style="width: 50%; margin: 10px auto;"/> <p>50: Safety module</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Cause of event</p> <p>12: SafeKfg. missing</p> </div>	<p>Display in the STO_FAULT state</p> <p>Safety configuration missing</p>



Display	Description
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>Status indicator</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: right;">0.0839 Incr. 10.43002 incr./s 0.0 A</p> <p>31: STO active</p> </div>	<p>Display in the STO state STOP, FAULT, FATAL</p>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>Activation Safety</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">&lt; - and - &gt;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">press for 2 seconds</p> </div>	<p>Following device replacement Request to press pushbuttons Saving of paramodule configuration to new drive controller.</p>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>Save values</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: right;">30%</p> <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: black; margin-top: 5px;"></div> </div>	<p>After pressing the diskette pushbutton or starting Action A00: Save values Acceptance of configuration and saving to the paramodule.</p>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>Activation Safety</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Do not switch off!</p> <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: black; margin-top: 5px;"></div> </div>	<p>Following device replacement Display during process of saving the configuration from the paramodule to the SE6.</p>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>Error</p> <hr/> <p>50: Safety module</p> <p>Cause of event</p> <p>11: SafeConfig. active</p> </div>	<p>Following device replacement The paramodule saving process was successful. The acceptance of the new safety configuration must be consciously acknowledged.</p>

Display	Description
<div style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; margin-bottom: 5px;">                     Error                 </div> 50: Safety module	Following device replacement The data could not be copied from the para- module.
Cause of event 13: ErrActivation	

## 8.5 Messages

Information about safety module messages can be found in the separate document "SE6 safety module – Diagnosis".

## 8.6 Diagnostic tests

- ▶ The safety module has a two-channel structure with internal diagnostic tests, thus no external safety system is required.
- ▶ The test functions for the hardware inputs and outputs are described in the chapter [Hardware inputs/outputs](#)  34].
- ▶ The encoder is subject to forced dynamisation, see [Motor encoder fault detection](#)  44].

## 9 Change, maintenance, decommissioning

### 9.1 Change

It may be necessary to change a process/machine because:

- ▶ A safety requirement has changed
- ▶ A systematic error has occurred
- ▶ There are new operational or production requirements
- ▶ The process cycle/machine has changed

Before changing a safe process/safe machine, a preparatory analysis must be carried out. The following effects must be analysed:

- ▶ How the changes will affect the safety of the process/machine
- ▶ How the changes will affect the safety functions of the safety module

The change requirements can be combined in a catalogue of requirements. This should include:

- ▶ Detected hazards
- ▶ Desired changes
- ▶ Reason for the changes

The change should only be carried out by persons with the necessary knowledge and experience (competent persons).



#### INFORMATION

- Note the information about assembly/disassembly in the operating manual for the Drive controller.
- Following a change, if the safety analysis has shown that safety functions need to be validated and tested, the change itself must be tested, as must the course of the entire process. This must be taken into account for recommissioning.
- Please note the requirements for recommissioning after a change.



#### NOTICE

The check sums can be used to establish whether safety-related changes have been made and therefore whether safety functions need to be validated and tested. However, a comparison may only be used as an additional aid. Under no circumstances can it replace a prior safety analysis for the changes.



## 9.2 Maintenance

No maintenance work is necessary on a SE6 safety module. Please return any faulty drive controllers with integrated safety modules to Stöber.

## 9.3 Decommissioning

Note the mission time  $t_M$  stated in the safety-related characteristic data of the safety module SE6.

Note the information about assembly/disassembly in the operating manual for the drive controller.

When decommissioning, please comply with local regulations regarding the disposal of electronic devices (e.g. Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act).

## 10 Field bus communication

Information about fieldbus communication is available in the operating manual for drive controller SD6. The parameters for the safety module are in the "S-Group".

# 11 Technical details

<b>General</b>	
Application range	<b>Failsafe</b>
<b>Absolute encoder input</b>	
Number of counter inputs	<b>1</b>
Type of counter inputs	<b>SSI encoder</b>
Supply voltage for absolute encoder	<b>5 ... 30 VDC</b>
Output signal (clock)	<b>Differential signal (RS-422/TTL)</b>
Max. number of bits on the counter input	<b>12 - 28 Bit</b>
Transmission rate	<b>300 kHz</b>
Coding of the input signal	<b>Binary, Gray</b>
Signal at the data input	<b>Differential signal (RS-422/TTL)</b>
<b>Incremental encoder input</b>	
Number of inputs	<b>1</b>
Supply voltage for incremental encoders	<b>5 ... 30 VDC</b>
Signal level at "1"	<b>&gt;= 2,5 V</b>
Signal level at "0"	<b>&lt;= 0,5 V</b>
Phase position for the differential signals A, /A and B, /B	<b>90° ±30°</b>
Maximum cutoff frequency	<b>0,5 MHz</b>
<b>Inputs</b>	
Number	<b>8</b>
Signal level at "0"	<b>-3 - +5 V DC</b>
Signal level at "1"	<b>15 - 30 V DC</b>
Input current range	<b>3,5 - 10,8 mA</b>
Pulse suppression	<b>1 - 10 ms</b>
<b>Semiconductor outputs</b>	
Number of positive-switching single-pole semiconductor outputs	<b>5</b>
External supply voltage	<b>24 V</b>
Voltage tolerance	<b>-15 %/+20 %</b>
Typ. output current at "1" signal and rated voltage of semiconductor output	<b>0,5 A</b>
Residual current at "0" signal	<b>0,02 mA</b>
Monitoring threshold of semiconductor output	<b>9 V</b>
Max. duration of on time during self test	<b>200 µs</b>
Max. duration of off time during self test	<b>200 µs</b>
Repetition time of the on/off test	<b>1,5 s</b>
Galvanic isolation	<b>yes</b>
Short circuit-proof	<b>yes</b>
<b>Semiconductor outputs, 2-pole</b>	
Number of dual-pole semiconductor outputs	<b>1</b>
Max. current at ambient temperature > 45 °C	<b>2,5 A</b>

<b>Semiconductor outputs, 2-pole</b>	
Typ. output current at "1" signal and rated voltage of semiconductor output	<b>3,6 A</b>
Max. switching frequency	<b>1 Hz</b>
Residual current at "0" signal	<b>0,5 mA</b>
Short circuit-proof	<b>yes</b>
<b>Brake output BD1/BD2</b>	
Max. current	<b>3 A</b>
Mean time to failure (MTTF)	<b>1098 years</b>
<b>Times</b>	
Cycle time, processor system	<b>3 ms</b>
Delay time, pulse disabler	<b>10 ms</b>
<b>Environmental data</b>	
Climatic suitability	<b>EN 60068-2-1</b>
Ambient temperature	
In accordance with the standard	<b>EN 60721-3-3</b>
Temperature range	<b>0 - 55 °C</b>
Storage temperature	
In accordance with the standard	<b>DIN EN 60721-3-1</b>
Temperature range	<b>-25 - 55 °C</b>
Max. change	<b>20 K/h</b>
Climatic suitability	
In accordance with the standard	<b>EN 60721-3-3</b>
Humidity	<b>85 % r.h.</b>
Condensation during operation	<b>Not permitted</b>
Max. operating height above sea level	<b>2000 m</b>
EMC	<b>EN 61800-3</b>
Vibration	
In accordance with the standard	<b>EN 60721-3-3</b>
Airgap creepage	
In accordance with the standard	<b>EN 61800-5-1</b>
Overvoltage category	<b>III</b>
Pollution degree	<b>2</b>
Protection type	
In accordance with the standard	<b>EN 60529</b>
Housing	<b>IP20</b>
Terminals	<b>IP20</b>
Mounting area (e.g. control cabinet)	<b>IP54</b>
<b>Mechanical data</b>	
Dimensions	
Height	<b>15,6 mm</b>
Width	<b>65,6 mm</b>
Depth	<b>260 mm</b>
Weight	<b>95 g</b>

Where standards are undated, the 2017-01 latest editions shall apply.

## 11.1 Safety characteristic data

The safety module SE6 carries out drive-related safety functions, as described in the EN 61800-5-2 standards, for example.

These safety functions generally only form part of an overall safety function that may consist of various subsystems.

The figure shows subsystems involved in the overall safety function as an example.




Fig.: Overall safety function and safety-related subsystems

A "safe drive controller" is a structural and functional unit consisting of

- ▶ A drive controller SD6 with integrated safety module SE6

To determine the safety integrity of the overall safety function, this operating manual for the **safe drive controller** subsystem

- ▶ Describes the safety functions.
- ▶ Provides the safety characteristic values for various operating modes.

- ▶ Describes the test functions for fault detection on other subsystems.

### Operating modes

Various configurations of the **safe drive controller** subsystem are represented via the operating modes.

They differ in

- ▶ The MTTF values of the sensor technology for safe position detection.

A set of safety-related characteristic data is assigned to a combination of safety function and operating mode.

### The operating modes differ with regard to the MTTF values of the sensor technology used for position detection

Safe speed and position values are processed for the safe motion/monitoring functions of the safety module. Fault detection takes place by cross-comparing 2 diverse sensors.

The following combinations of sensors for safe position detection can be used:

- ▶ Motor encoder and internal system variables
- ▶ Motor encoder and external encoder

See also under [Motor encoder fault detection](#)  44]

To simplify the calculation, sensor combinations with assumed failure rates are included in the safety-related characteristic data. The following differences arise in the operating modes:

- ▶ Operating mode **Encoder MTTF  $\geq 10a$** 
  - Motor encoder with MTTF  $\geq 10$  years and internal system variables
  - Motor encoder with MTTF  $\geq 10$  years and external encoder with MTTF  $\geq 10$  years
  - In accordance with EN ISO 13849-1, an MTTF<sub>D</sub> of ten years can be assumed for a component if no manufacturer data is available.
  - The mission time of the motor encoder must be  $T_M = 20$  years.
- ▶ Operating mode **Encoder MTTF > 57a**
  - Motor encoder with MTTF  $\geq 57$  years and internal system variables
  - Motor encoder with MTTF  $\geq 57$  years and external encoder with MTTF  $\geq 57$  years
  - The MTTF value of the encoder employed must be reviewed.
  - The mission time of the motor encoder must be  $T_M = 20$  years.

Assuming that all faults are dangerous, MTTF<sub>D</sub> = MTTF can be set. The characteristic data MTTF is a property of the sensor, which can only be stated by the manufacturer.

**Overview of operating modes and safety-related characteristic data**

Operating mode	Description	Safety integrity Restrictions
Encoder MTTF $\geq 10a$	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Position sensors possible in this operating mode                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Motor encoder with MTTF <math>\geq 10</math> years and internal system variables</li> <li>– Motor encoder and external encoder with MTTF <math>\geq 10</math> years</li> </ul> </li> <li>▶ Safety functions that can be used in this operating mode                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Stop functions: STO, SS1, SS2</li> <li>– Motion functions: SLS, SSR, SOS, SDI, SLI, SLP</li> <li>– Monitoring functions: SLS-M, SSR-M, SOS-M, SDI-M, SLI-M, SLP-M</li> <li>– Brake management: SBC, SBT</li> <li>– Other safety functions: SRL, SSO</li> </ul> </li> <li>▶ External interfaces that can be used in this safety function operating mode:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– 2 x safe input, 1-pole</li> <li>– 2 x safe output, 1-pole</li> <li>– 1 x safe output, 2-pole</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>SIL 2, PL d (Cat. 3)</p> <p>Limitation imposed by the failure rate of the encoder system</p>
Encoder MTTF $\geq 57a$	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Position sensors possible in this operating mode                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Motor encoder with MTTF <math>\geq 57</math> years and internal system variables</li> <li>– Motor encoder and external encoder with MTTF <math>\geq 57</math> years</li> </ul> </li> <li>▶ Safety functions that can be used in this operating mode                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Stop functions: STO, SS1, SS2</li> <li>– Motion functions: SLS, SSR, SOS, SDI, SLI, SLP</li> <li>– Monitoring functions: SLS-M, SSR-M, SOS-M, SDI-M, SLI-M, SLP-M</li> <li>– Brake management: SBC, SBT</li> <li>– Other safety functions: SRL, SSO</li> </ul> </li> <li>▶ External interfaces that can be used in this safety function operating mode:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– 2 x safe input, 1-pole</li> <li>– 2 x safe output, 1-pole</li> <li>– 1 x safe output, 2-pole</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>SIL 3, PL e (Cat. 4)</p>



**NOTICE**

You must comply with the safety characteristic data in order to achieve the required safety level for your plant/machine.

Operating mode	EN ISO 13849-1: 2015 PL	EN ISO 13849-1: 2015 Category	EN IEC 62061 SIL CL/ maximum SIL	EN IEC 62061 PFH <sub>D</sub> [1/h]	EN/IEC 61511 SIL	EN/IEC 61511 PFD	EN ISO 13849-1: 2015 T <sub>M</sub> [year]
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DIO, en-coder MTTF ≥ 10a	<b>PL d</b>	<b>Cat. 3</b>	<b>SIL CL 2</b>	<b>1,12E-09</b>	<b>SIL 2</b>	<b>9,40E-05</b>	<b>20</b>
DIO, en-coder MTTF ≥ 57a	<b>PL e</b>	<b>Cat. 4</b>	<b>SIL CL 3</b>	<b>5,13E-10</b>	<b>SIL 3</b>	<b>4,45E-05</b>	<b>20</b>

All the units used within a safety function must be considered when calculating the safety characteristic data.



**INFORMATION**

A safety function's SIL/PL values are **not** identical to the SIL/PL values of the units that are used and may be different. We recommend that you use the PAScal software tool to calculate the safety function's SIL/PL values.



## 11.2 Classification according to ZVEI, CB24I

The following tables describe the classes and specific values of the product interface and the classes of interfaces compatible with it. The classification is described in the ZVEI position paper "Classification of Binary 24 V Interfaces - Functional Safety aspects covered by dynamic testing".

Inputs

Source			Drain		
Safety control system	C0		Safety module	C0	

Drain parameters	Min.	Typ.	Max.
Test impulse duration	-	-	10 ms
Test impulse interval	40 ms	-	
Input resistance	2,2 kOhm	-	
Capacitive load	-	-	68 nF

Safe 1-pole HL outputs

Source			Drain		
Safety module	C2		Safety control system	C2	

Source parameters	Min.	Typ.	Max.
Test impulse duration	-	-	200 µs
Rated current	-	-	0,5 A
Capacitive load	-	-	0,5 µF

Safe dual-pole SC outputs

Source			Drain		
Safety module	D2		Brake	D2	

Source parameters	Min.	Typ.	Max.
Test impulse duration	150 µs	-	350 µs
Test impulse interval	600 ms	-	
Leakage current in OFF-state	-	-	0,5 mA
Nominal current in ON-state	-	-	3,6 A
Capacitive load	-	-	0,5 µF

### **Safe Brake Control (SBC)**

Safety function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "The SBC function supplies a safe output signal or signals to drive an external mechanical brake or brakes."

### **Safe Brake Test (SBT)**

Supplementary safety function: The safety function SBT tests the proper functioning of a closed-current brake.

### **Safe Direction (SDI)**

Safety function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "The SDI function prevents the motor shaft from moving in an unintended direction."

### **Safe Operating Stop (SOS)**

Safety function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "The SOS function prevents the motor from deviating from the stop position by more than a defined amount. The PDS(SR) (electrical power drive system) supplies power to the motor that enables it to withstand the engagement of external forces."

### **Safe Restart Lock (SRL)**

This supplementary safety function prevents uncontrolled start-up following a fault / interruption.

### **Safe Speed Range (SSR)**

Safety function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "The SSR function holds the motor speed within defined limit values."

### **Safe Status Output (SSO)**

Supplementary safety function: This is used for diagnostic purposes and provides the safe outputs with status information.

### **Safe Stop 1 (SS1)**

Safety function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "The PDS(SR) performs one of these functions: a) Either initiates and controls the length of the motor delay within defined limits and initiates the STO function (see 4.2.2.2) if the motor speed falls below a defined limit

value, or b) Initiates and monitors the length of the motor delay within defined limits and initiates the STO function if the motor speed drops below a defined limit value, or c) Initiates the motor delay and then initiates the STO function after an application-specific time delay."

### **Safe Stop 2 (SS2)**

Safety function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "The PDS(SR) performs one of these functions: a) Either initiates and controls the length of the motor delay within defined limits and initiates the SOS function (see 4.2.3.1) if the motor speed falls below a defined limit value, or b) Initiates and monitors the length of the motor delay within defined limits and initiates the SOS function if the motor speed drops below a defined limit value, or c) Initiates the motor delay and then initiates the SOS function after an application-specific time delay."

### **Safe Torque Off (STO)**

Stop function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "No power that can cause a rotation (or in the case of a linear motor, a movement) is supplied to the motor. The PDS(SR) (electrical power drive system) does not supply any power to the motor that can generate torque (or in the case of a linear motor, force)."

### **Safely Limited Increment (SLI)**

Safety function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "The SLI function prevents the motor shaft from exceeding the specified limit of position increment."

### **Safely Limited Position (SLP)**

Safety function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "The SLP function prevents the motor shaft from exceeding the specified position limit(s)."

### **Safely Limited Speed (SLS)**

Safety function in accordance with EN 61800-5-2: "The SLS function prevents the motor from exceeding the specified speed limit."

**Safely Monitored Direction (SDI-M)**

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Supplementary safety function: The monitoring function SDI-M is based on the normative safety function SDI. Exceeding the parameterised limit values is reported but does not trigger any error reaction function.

**Safely Monitored Position (SLP-M)**

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Supplementary safety function: The monitoring function SLP-M is based on the normative safety function SLP. Exceeding the parameterised limit values is reported but does not trigger any error reaction function.

**Safely Monitored Speed (SLS-M)**

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Supplementary safety function: The monitoring function SLS-M is based on the normative safety function SLS. Exceeding the parameterised limit values is reported but does not trigger any error reaction function.

**Safely Monitored Speed Range (SSR-M)**

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Supplementary safety function: The monitoring function SSR-M is based on the normative safety function SSR. Exceeding the parameterised limit values is reported but does not trigger any error reaction function.

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STÖBER ANTRIEBSTECHNIK GmbH + Co. KG

Kieselbronner Straße 12

75177 Pforzheim

Germany

Tel. +49 7231 582-0

[mail@stoeber.de](mailto:mail@stoeber.de)

[www.stober.com](http://www.stober.com)

24 h Service Hotline +49 7231 582-3000